Pathfinder Indian Ocean Security Conference

MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP

March 18, 2019
Colombo, Sri Lanka

Organized by the Centre for Indo-Lanka Initiatives
of Pathfinder Foundation

Sponsored by the Embassy of Japan
Concept Note

Background

The Pathfinder Foundation, conducted two successful conferences referred to as ‘Trincomalee Consultations 2017 and 2018’. The theme of the first conference was ‘Regional Cooperation for Economic and Maritime Security in the Bay of Bengal’ and the second event focused on ‘Secure and Safe Bay of Bengal for Common Development and Prosperity’. ‘Trincomalee Consultations-2018’ focused on three key outcomes of the ‘Trincomalee Consultations 2017’ as follows:

- Review the unfolding geo-strategic significance of and assess the regional security cooperation demands in the Bay of Bengal Region.

- Examine the current state of cooperation among the countries in the Bay of Bengal Region in maritime transport, aviation and other sectors of economic activity. Establishing centers for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Law of the Sea and a Maritime Research Center in Trincomalee, focusing on the Bay of Bengal.

- Discuss the potential for developing Trincomalee as a regional hub for shipping (with special focus on coastal shipping), aviation, petro-chemicals, high-speed rail connectivity, electricity grid connectivity, enhancing people-to-people connectivity through religious, cultural, eco-tourism and other sectors of economic activity to serve the Bay of Bengal Region and develop a way forward for further enhancement of cooperation.

Both conferences were conducted as track 1.5 initiatives with the participation of senior government officials from India, Japan, Sri Lanka, scholars, subject matter experts, business leaders and representatives of think tanks from participating countries. Both events mainly focused on South Asia and the Bay of Bengal regions with a view to address geo-strategic and geo-economic issues, maritime security concerns and cooperation and use of Trincomalee as a hub for the Bay of Bengal connectivity.

Based on the success achieved and feedback obtained from the participants, it was considered desirable to conduct a broader conference focusing on security and governance aspects of the Indian Ocean with a view to contributing to the broad vision of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” construct.

Purpose

The main purpose of the proposed Pathfinder Indian Ocean Security Conference (PF-IOSC) is to address multifaceted issues impacting on the Indian Ocean. It was designed to be a track 1.5 event participated by countries in the Indian Ocean region and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to address two broad areas viz. (i) Maritime Security and (ii) Maritime Governance. The meeting of the International Advisory Group (IAG) held on March 18, 2019 was intended to prepare ground for the PF-IOSC, which will be convened in early 2020.

The PF-IOSC was expected to create a platform for all stakeholders i. e. policy makers, relevant government officials, researchers, scholars, subject matter experts, think-tank representatives etc., to maintain security and stability in the Indian Ocean, in accordance with international law and practices, including freedom of navigation and overflight, where all states would act free from coercion.
Benefits

The platform provided by the PF-IOSC for an open and free discussion is expected to create a conducive environment to address existing mistrust and rivalry among the regional and extra-regional states, impact on security arising from climate change, ocean pollution, global warming, transnational maritime crime etc. It was the expectation of the Pathfinder Foundation that an open discussion on these and other related issues would result in mutually beneficial win-win situations for the littorals as well as other users of the Indian Ocean, both major and minor.

The platform provided by the conference could also be used to enhance bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation and collaboration to address threats in this global maritime common. It will also provide opportunities for networking and fellowship among participants and policy makers.

The final objective of PF-IOSC will be to contribute to the discourse on the freedom of navigation and overfly in accordance with the International Public Law governing the oceans (UNCLOS) and reach an understanding on these principles and contribute to the collective development of the countries in the Indian Ocean region. Agreeing upon a new Indian Ocean Order or establishing a Regional Maritime Security Network could also be discussed in this forum.

International Advisory Group (IAG)

To facilitate preparatory work, the PF Indian Ocean Security Conference will be preceded by a meeting of the International Advisory Group (IAG), which has been constituted to provide guidance and support for substantive and organizational aspects of the conference. This Group would consist of Track II participants from:

i. India: Amb. Shivshankar Menon, Former Ambassador, Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor of India - Chairman of IAG;

ii. Australia: Dr. Darren Lim, Senior Lecturer, School of Politics and International Relations, Australia National University;

iii. China: Prof. Penghong Cai, Senior Fellow, Shanghai Institutes of International Studies;

iv. France : Dr. Frederic Grare, Charge de mission Asie, Center d’Analyse de Prévision et de Stratégie ;


vi. Norway: Mr. Christian Holmboe Ruge, Programme Director, Norwegian Center for Conflict Resolution (NOREF);

vii. Russian Federation: Ms. Ksenia Kuzmina, Program Manager - South Asia and Asia Pacific, Russian International Affairs Council;

vii. Sri Lanka: Admiral Prof. Jayanath Colombage, Director, Center for Indo-Lanka Initiatives and Law of the Sea, Pathfinder Foundation;

viii. Singapore: Mr. Hernaikh Singh, Senior Associate Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore;
ix. The UK: Mr. Viraj Solanki, Research Analyst for South Asia, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

x. The US: Ms. Alyssa Ayres, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations.

Development of themes for discussion at the PF-IOSC, identification of speakers and other participants will be done in consultation with the IAG.

**Focal Points**

Focal Points from each participating country for the PF-IOSC will be identified in advance by the IAG. These Focal Points would consist of think tanks, research centers related to ocean affairs or government agencies focusing on the related field. Professionals or academics could be invited either to make presentations or participate in the conference.

**Suggested Themes for Discussion at the IAG**

I. Traditional Maritime Security Threats (threats posed by state and non-state actors including militarization within IOR, terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, smuggling and trafficking, illegal migration & influx of refugees, irregular and illegal fisheries etc.) and Non-traditional maritime security threats (issues related to climate change, degradation of marine environment due to pollution and other negative impacts of exploitation of ocean resource etc.) and possible solutions at regional and extra-regional levels.

II. Maritime Governance Issues in the Indian Ocean: Law of the Sea, Rules Based Maritime Order, need for a maritime security architecture/regime and role of international and regional associations such as IORA, IONS, Galle Dialogue, BIMSTEC, SAARC, WPNS, ASEAN.

III. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision: Implications and Challenges.

IV. Maritime Infrastructure Development Projects & their impact on the Indian Ocean (BRI, AAGC, SAGAR, ‘Sagarmala’, Tri-lateral agreement between USA, Japan and Australia for Infrastructure Development in IOR): Challenges and Opportunities.

**Objectives of the IAG Meeting**

It was expected to find recommendations, inter alia to the following, as the outcome of the IAG meeting:

i. What should be the participation at the PF-IOSC-2020? Should it be at track 1.5 or track 2 level?

ii. What should be the subjects/issues PF-IOSC should focus on at the 2020 conference?

iii. Which countries and organizations (regional/international) should be invited?

iv. How do we see the Indian Ocean maritime domain evolving with the advancements made by Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Maritime Industry 4.0.

v. How do countries in the Indian Ocean region work toward a regional approach to Blue Economy as part of human security?

vi. How to define/refine the “Rule Based Maritime Order, in relation to freedom of navigation, overflight and maritime commerce”?
vii. What role Sri Lanka could play in response to evolving maritime situation in the Indian Ocean?

viii. How should issues relating to maritime terrorism, piracy, smuggling of drugs, humans and weapons and illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing and maritime pollution in the Indian Ocean be addressed?
AGENDA


0910 – 0940  Overview of Indian Ocean Security and Governance by Chairman of IAG, Amb. Shivshankar Menon, Former Ambassador, Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor of India.

0940 – 1000  Discussion

1000 – 1030  Coffee/Tea Break Group Photograph

Country Perspectives:

1030 – 1050  **Australia**
Dr. Darren Lim, Senior Lecturer, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University.

1050 – 1110  **China**
Prof. Cai Penghong, Senior Fellow, Shanghai Institutes of International Studies

1110 – 1130  **France**
Dr. Frederic Grare, Charge de mission Asie, Le Centre d’analyse de Prévision et de Stratégie,

1130 – 1200  Discussion

1200 – 1300  Lunch Break

1300 – 1320  **Japan**

1320 – 1340  **Norway**
Christian Ruge, Programme Director, Norwegian Center for Conflict Resolution.

1340 – 1400  **The Russian Federation**
Ms. Ksenia Kuzmina, Program Manager-South Asia and Asia Pacific, Russian International Affairs Council.

1400 – 1420  **Singapore**
Mr. Hernaikh Singh, Senior Associate Director, Institute of South Asian Studies of National University of Singapore.

1420 – 1450  Discussion
1450 – 1520  Tea/Coffee Break

1520 – 1540  Sri Lanka
Admiral Prof. Jayanath Colombage, Director, Centre for Indo-Lanka Initiatives and Law of the Sea, Pathfinder Foundation.

1540 – 1600  The UK
Mr. Viraj Solanki, Research Analyst for South Asia, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

1600 – 1620  The US
Ms. Alyssa Ayres, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations

1620 – 1650  Discussion

1700 – 1730  Formulation of Themes for proposed PFIOCS

Closing Remarks by Admiral (Prof.) Jayanath Colombage
Opening Remarks

Amb. Bernard Goonetilleke
Chairman, Pathfinder Foundation

Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, Chairperson of IAG,
H.E. Mr. Akira Sugiyama, Ambassador of Japan,
Your Excellencies,
Participants representing Colombo based diplomatic missions,
Distinguished members of International Advisory Group,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to extend a warm welcome to members of the IAG, who flew in from a number of foreign capitals to attend this meeting.

At the outset, I wish to express appreciation of the Pathfinder Foundation to Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, who kindly agreed to chair the meeting of IAG. He is a well-known figure in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, having served as head of missions in Tel Aviv, Colombo, Beijing and Islamabad and as Foreign Secretary as well as National Security Advisor of India. We are extremely fortunate, not only to have his presence among us, but also to see him guiding this meeting.

At the same time, I wish to express appreciation of the Pathfinder Foundation to H.E. Mr. Akira Sugiyama, Ambassador of Japan in Sri Lanka and the efficient staff attached to the Embassy, who extended their full support to make today’s meeting a reality. I must add that this is not the first time, when the Embassy of Japan got the backing of Tokyo to support programmes initiated by PF.

At the outset, I must make it clear that Pathfinder Foundation is a not-for-profit organization, which has been active since 2003 and expanded its focus to cover areas such as security and strategic issues during the past 5 years.

PF is responsible for three distinct institutions. They are the ‘Centre for Indo-Lanka Initiatives’, ‘China-Sri Lanka Cooperation Studies Centre’ and ‘Centre for Law of the Sea’. However, I must add that our interests are much wider than these three broad subject areas.

Sri Lanka’s interest in the Indian Ocean is quite understandable. Located 10-12 nautical miles north of the busy sea lane that connects the Far East with the West since time immemorial, and with nothing in between our southern coast and the continent of Antarctica, there is so much for Sri Lanka to ponder over the Indian Ocean.

There is yet another reason for all of us to show a keen interest in the well-being of our oceans. They sustain life on earth, help determine the global climate, acts as a carbon sink and above all feed multitude of people. Oceans are important for the wellbeing of the global economy; they help ferry app. 90% of global trade and provides app. 1/3 of our hydro carbon supplies. In return, we pollute the oceans with industrial waste, sewage and plastics and worse still overfish the oceans with gay abandon. And unsurprisingly, oceans return the favour, by changing the global climate for the worse.

Natural assets of littoral countries in the Indian Ocean (I. O.) were coveted by the European colonial powers since the early 16th century. However, even after the decolonization process in the second half of the 20th century, appeal for the I. O. continued. The I. O. was the centre of attraction during the Great Power rivalry during the post WW II period, which prompted littoral and hinterland countries to demand the I. O. be declared a zone of peace.
Almost half a century later, we are refocusing on the I. O. with considerable intensity. There should be a very good reason for this renewed interest. One such reason is the general acceptance that the 21st Century will be dominated by Asia. The second is the importance of the I. O., both strategically and commercially, details of which, I am confident, will be discussed during our deliberations.

Today’s focus is security issues impacting on the I. O. However, while discussing security both traditional as well as non-traditional, we will also be dealing with governance issues.

Speaking on I. O. security, and Asia’s role in the 21st century, we cannot ignore two major facts. First, is the role of the U. S, which functioned as the security guarantor for several decades, particularly in the post-Cold War era. The second, is the role of emerging Asian naval powers, such as China and India. As we know, China has been building its blue navy as a part of its “forward sea defence” programme, equipped with aircraft carriers, submarines and other air assets.

Meanwhile, India, the dominant regional power too, is taking steps to expand its blue naval capabilities by investing heavily on similar assets and also functioning as ‘security guarantor’ to some countries in the IOR. The US considers India as its strategic partner, while treating China as its strategic competitor. The emerging scenario, and other considerations have prompted China to take measures to address the situation, including protection of sea lanes to ensure uninterrupted access to raw materials as well as markets for its finished products. This in turn seems to be creating a response, which could lead to the situation going out of control in time of a conflict.

Apart from traditional security concerns, we also have to address non-traditional security issues. As we all know, oceans are increasingly being used for transnational crime, acts of piracy, smuggling of narcotic drugs and weapons, illegal migration etc. which could result in security threats to some countries. The situation in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa, which required establishment of ‘Operation Ocean Field’, a multinational naval force through resolutions adopted by the UNSC, is one such example.

In addition to natural disasters, man-made catastrophes such as irreversible ocean pollution, overfishing and even regional conflicts could result in movement of people that could cause security threats to countries within and outside the region.

Individual countries in the region have the responsibility to address these issues. However, lack of will, capacity and resources prevent them from taking measures to address such conditions. The current situation of ‘sea blindness’ experienced by Indian Ocean countries is a factor that contributes to the problem. Undoubtedly, there is a case for close cooperation and assistance among the countries in the Indian Ocean region and major maritime powers to address such lacunae.

May I venture to say that at least some, if not most of the issues, confronting us could be addressed by relying on confidence building measures. CBMs have the potential to help improve and stabilize political relations, build confidence, enhance security and prepare the way for more constructive measures to address prickly situations. When nations are faced with situations of insecurity and misunderstanding due to real or perceived military capabilities and or intentions, CBMs could help ease situations and steer clear of confrontation.

There may be other options, such as re-visiting UNCLOS to fill in the gaps not identified in 1982, or further empowerment of UN institutions associated with marine affairs, such as IMO, International Tribunal of Law of the Sea, International Seabed Authority etc.

In conclusion, I wish a productive exchange of views during our deliberations and express the hope that IAG would come up with recommendations for a successful Conference on Indian Ocean Security to be held next year, which will be attended by countries in the Indian Ocean region and major maritime users.
Address by

H.E. Akira Sugiyma  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan in Sri Lanka

Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, Chairman, Pathfinder Foundation,  
Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, Chairman of the International Advisory Group,  
Honourable Secretaries,  
Your Excellencies Ambassadors and High Commissioners,  
Distinguished participants,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good Morning.

It gives me great pleasure to say a few words on the opening of this important meeting today. First and foremost, let me begin by extending my heartfelt appreciation to Mr. Milinda Moragoda, Founder of the Pathfinder Foundation, and his team, led by Ambassador Goonetilleke and Admiral Jayanth Colombage, Director of the Centre for Indo-Lanka Initiatives and Law of the Sea, for taking great initiative in materializing this exceptional event, with gems of wisdom assembled from different parts of the world to discuss the Indian Ocean Security, which is gaining greater attention in the world today. We are extremely pleased to be a partner of Pathfinder Foundation once again after fruitful discussions at “Trincomalee Consultations” for the last two years, and, on behalf of the Government of Japan, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all the distinguished participants for making this event resourceful through active engagement and valuable contribution.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On August 22, 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, during his maiden prime ministerial visit to India, delivered a speech in the Central Hall of the Indian Parliament. Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, who is present here today as Chairman of the International Advisory Group, was the then Secretary of Indian Foreign Ministry, and may as well recall this historic speech with renewed significance. The speech was entitled “Confluence of the Two Seas”, inspired by the book under the same name authored by the Mughal prince Dara Shikoh in 1665.

The two seas mentioned here, needless to say, refer to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, while Prime Minister Abe went further to elaborate that both seas are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of “freedom” and of “prosperity”, and emphasized the importance of ensuring that these seas become “seas of clearest transparency.” After more than a decade since the speech was made, these words have gained compelling relevance in the present context, standing like a steadfast beacon in the middle of uncharted nautical road.

Distinguished participants,

The vision of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, “FOIP” in short, which was announced by Prime Minister Abe in August 2016, has its roots firmly embedded in the afore-mentioned speech, and is an inclusive concept to all countries that support its basic principles. Located at the heart of the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka has been playing a prominent role in promoting peace and stability of the Indian Ocean and is an important partner to promote the vision of FOIP. In view of this, it is all the more significant to hold “Indian Ocean Security Conference” in this island nation. Again, I commend the Pathfinder Foundation’s initiative based on deep insight into the current strategic environment, and expect that today’s meeting will lay a good ground work for the conference to be convened next year.

With an observation that the key to stability and prosperity of the international community depends largely on the dynamism created by the synergy between the “two continents”, that is, rapidly growing Asia and Africa with huge
growth potential, as well as “two free open seas”, namely the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, FOIP envisages the following 3 principles:

(i). promotion and establishment of the rule of law and freedom of navigation;

(ii). pursuit of economic prosperity by improving connectivity and value chains through “quality infrastructure” development in accordance with international standards, with particular emphasis on (i) open access, (ii) transparency, (iii) economic efficiency including life-cycle cost, and (iv) financial viability of recipient countries; and,

(iii). commitment to peace and security, for example, by assisting capacity building on maritime law enforcement and strengthening cooperation for anti-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and non-proliferation.

In the area of maritime safety and security, which is of more relevance to today’s agenda, Japan has been extending assistance to Sri Lanka by, (a) granting two new patrol vessels to Sri Lankan Coast Guard, (b) extending advisory services for improving oil spill management to Sri Lankan Coast Guard, and (c) supporting VBSS (Visit, Board, Search and Seizure) Training Courses that have been jointly organized by the Sri Lankan Navy and UNODC since 2017 in Trincomalee, among others.

Distinguished participants,

In the face of mounting challenges, both traditional and non-traditional, such as piracy, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters and illegal operations including drug smuggling, human trafficking and IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing, it is imperative to respond to such massive challenges through enhanced coordination of the international community, with the view to maintaining the Indian Ocean, as well as the Pacific, as “Global Commons” or “international public goods” for all. As I stand before the prominent opinion leaders gathered to reach common goals here today, I am more convinced than ever that confidence building through closer exchanges of new ideas is becoming increasingly important to “find the path”, as the very name of the Foundation suggests, that goes beyond the traditional perception of “zero-sum game” to create a situation that benefits us all. I am certain that today’s discussion will be instrumental in finding such “a way forward” through active and intensive interaction among the distinguished participants.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before closing, I wish to renew my heartfelt invitation to all the participants at my official residence this evening to commemorate the successful completion of the conference, as well as to neutralize the “hot discussion” that might occasionally take place in the course of daytime’s sessions. Please join us and enjoy the casual networking over savory food and drinks.

On this note and my sincere appreciation to Pathfinder Foundation once again for organizing this iconic conference in a timely manner, I would like to conclude my opening remarks.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.
Overview of Indian Ocean Security and Governance by
Chairman, IAG

Amb. Shivshankar Menon
Former Ambassador, Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor of India

Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, Ambassador Akira Sugiyama, distinguished members of the IAG, ladies and gentlemen.

Let me begin by joining the Ambassador of Japan in thanking the Pathfinder Foundation for bringing us together to discuss something both timely and important and also for the very thoughtful and meticulous arrangements to make us all so welcome. It’s a pleasure to be back with friends again and thank you very much for this.

We have a lot of work to go through in one day as Amb. Goonetilleke and Amb. Sugiyama reminded us, because if you start thinking of Indian Ocean security and governance, the list is long and our job is to see how we can prepare for a productive, useful conference on these issues and how to shape it so that it actually reflects not just where we are – in the heart of the Indian ocean in Sri Lanka, but also how we can make a constructive contribution, when there are a host of conferences, which discuss this issue. I think that is really the task of the IAG today. So, together we can look at what issues the Pathfinder Foundation can focus on next year at the PF-IOSC.

Before the European cartographic traditions, Indian, Japanese and Chinese cartographers used to draw the world with the south on top, which is I presume what you would do sitting in Sri Lanka and then the world looks very different, certainly the Indian Ocean looks very different, but what you see is that the seas are one, which as naval instructors would say, that the seas are inter-connected as per the newly fashionable word – Indo Pacific. It is because the oceans have been the primary source of communication, food, and cheapest means of transport throughout history. Central to that connectivity is really the Indian Ocean, as it is what links large open bodies of water around the world and that is also why it is so hard to categorize or regionalize the Indian Ocean stretching all the way from the Arabian sea and Persian Gulf to the South China sea, which is integral to the littoral economies and to the security of our countries. For us, the Indian Ocean countries, our trade, energy fuel and our security depend to a great extent on these waters.

These seas have different geographies. The Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans are open oceans unlike enclosed bodies of water like the South China sea, Mediterranean Sea, Black sea and so on. As for the Indian ocean, especially, no power in history has managed to control all the entry/exit points surrounding it, not even the Royal Navy. That says something, which is, why it has always been an ocean of trade and transport rather than a battle space unlike the enclosed seas. Our job is to make sure we keep it that way.

Today, we are on the cusp of witnessing the center of the world’s economic gravity shifting towards the Asia Pacific. The issue really is that naval buildup by the states in this region in the last two decades have been quite striking. This is typical of the behaviour of states, which fear instability and harbour fear of their neighbours. Inter-state rivalry exists whether we like it or not, mostly in the minds, not only in the conduct of states in their balancing attempts they undertake, but also in the internal balancing and naval builds that we see across the region.

And yet, compared to other bodies of water around the world, inter-state security issues in the Indian Ocean are not apparent yet. But the reality is, if you look at inter-state behaviour in the recent past and the kind of naval builds we have seen, this actually could start affecting the real security situation. And yet, today, what is our experience? There is piracy in the Strait of Malacca and off the horn of Africa. We have cooperated successfully in dealing with this situation in the last two decades and we have done this on an ad-hoc basis without institutional backing and now we have security issues, which really fall in to two categories – one is those, which are purely maritime issues for which there are solutions at sea, and there are those, which need resolution both on land and
sea. There are very few purely maritime issues and most of those are actually positive sum issues such as ecological and humanitarian, and search and rescue missions. Whereas rivalry among powers include terrorism, transnational crime and refugees, which are problems that land has exported to the sea, which have created maritime security problems like the Andaman Sea crisis involving boat people.

Therefore, we have two separate sets of problems:

i. Interstate rivalries and issues that are not critical yet, but measures should be in place now, whether it be dialogues, cooperation or confidence building measures before we have a crisis, so that we could address the issue, if and when we are in a position to deal with it.

ii. The positive sum issues, which we call transnational threats. However, they are not only threats, they are also opportunities as much as they are threats, for us to get together and do something about them.

Today is a good day for us to discuss these issues. We are not too late; it’s probably the right time and enough people understand the importance of the Indian Ocean today. This is probably the best time for us to try and see what we should be doing. If we look at the commitments towards actual connectivity, economic and political integration of the Indian Ocean rim countries, two countries have made large investments. Japan, for a consistently and relatively long period of time, and China both on land and sea. China has worked to connect Eurasian heartland through the Belt and Road Initiative. This initiative has long term geopolitical implications. This is yet another reason, why now is the time to start looking at security issues in ensuring that we keep this region peaceful, secure and remains free and open to everyone.

On the governance side, it is a common complaint from all of us that we lack institutional coherence, not having economic and political institutions that help us to address the issues we face. There are institutions such as IORA, IONS etc. which could be the seed of an institutional architecture, but they show limited signs of doing so today. This is a theoretical approach. In practice, both in terms of building connectivity and in terms of economic integration, we have responded in an ad-hoc manner to the threats we face. We do have a basis in the rule of law i.e. UNCLOS, which actually gives us sufficient basis to build on what we have. We need to keep reminding ourselves that we are not dealing with a situation of anarchy or an operating in a vacuum. We need to remind ourselves that we have given ourselves a set of laws and rules, which we have to apply to the situation in the Indian Ocean Region.

We all swear by a free and open Indo Pacific, Indian Ocean or Asia Pacific, but it seems to mean very different things in practice to each of us. The conclusion I draw is that it would not be any single or rigid security architecture, which is the answer to our situation or to the threats we might envisage. Given the rivalry and mistrust among major naval powers, what we need is a much more flexible approach. My own suggestion would be to start building maritime security in the IOR, from the bottom up, block by block, bit by bit, dealing with, whether it is Maritime Domain Awareness, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, anti-piracy or seeking environmental protection. Not everything has to be done or agreed by everybody or applied right through the region. My approach would be to build issue-based cohesions with the willing, to deal with problems that we have. It is a much more practical method, which has a likelihood of success rather than trying to impose one size fits all mental concepts on each other.

Of course, we need dialogue among the states. It is their rivalry and mistrust, which is the source of worry about Indian Ocean security. We need to encourage dialogue and some kind of crisis management mechanisms between them, but we also need to establish the habit of cooperation among maritime stakeholders in our societies. Be they fishermen’s associations, shipping industries, port operators, marine police etc. they have a common interest and this is where the positive sum nature of the domain actually can assert itself so that solutions are not only to be found in track I and track II levels, but also need some ways of combining these. That would be my own suggestion.

Let me end by saying that what we need to do over the course of the day is to really try and get some clarity around the few basic concrete questions:
i. What should be the participation in the Pathfinder Indian Ocean Security Conference in 2020?

ii. Should it be track I, 1.5 or II exercise?

iii. How do we structure it? What sort of an agenda and issues to discuss?

iv. Where does this conference take us and what is Sri Lanka’s advantage in terms of the Indian Ocean (obviously located in the heart of the IO) having credibility for Sri Lanka in a position to be able to lead this discussion. How do we lever these advantages?

v. The ultimate question – this rule based maritime order, which is to be free and open – how do we actually get this to become a reality? What could we do as a conference to actually make that possible?

I welcome you all and look forward very much to working together today and in the future.

Thank you very much.
COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES

1. Indian Ocean Region: Maritime Security and Maritime Governance: A view from Australia

Dr. Darren Lim  
Senior Lecturer, School of Politics and International Relations, Australia National University

A. Introduction

- Echoed comments of Amb. Menon – focus on particular characteristics of maritime domain.
- It’s worth noting the increasing importance of the maritime domain, which is why initiatives like this become so important.
- The very concept of the “Indo-Pacific” takes its name from the two oceans, highlighting the fact that maritime issues are increasingly prominent in each state’s national interests, including in the issue domains of security, rules/institutions, economic relationships.
  - In other words, the regional order governing the maritime domain, and the conduct of states in the maritime space, can affect not just the security but the sovereignty and prosperity of affected states.
- This suggests that more thinking—by both scholars and practitioners—about what makes maritime cooperation different, and how the structural features of the maritime domain shape and constrain the nature of potential conflicts of interest, the scope of cooperation problems, and the types of rules and institutions and other decision-making structure that are going to be most effective.

B. Australian interests

Australia is of course an Indian Ocean littoral state with significant strategic and economic interests in the security and prosperity of the IOR:

- Very large EEZ, largest search and rescue zone,
- Offshore territories in the IOR (closer to New Delhi than Canberra),
- Over half of Australian exports leave from Indian Ocean ports and the other half of its trade crosses the Indian Ocean.

This means Australia has a strong interest in the peaceful development of an open, inclusive and prosperous Indian Ocean region, in which rights of all states are respected. 
Foreign Minister Payne: “the peaceful and open character of this ocean is a vital national interest for Australia”.

It’s worth understanding the long-standing pillars of Australian foreign policy as a pathway into our specific interests in a given area.

i. The need to partner and indeed embed with a major power ally with whom we share core values and strategic interests - the United States, since the end of WW II.

ii. It is important to engage with our region as a strategic and an economic imperative.

iii. Active participation in and promotion of a rules-based international order.

These pillars reflect (i) our values as a liberal democracy that believes in open markets and open societies and (ii) the reality of Australia’s size and its location.

- As a middle power, Australia will rarely if ever, wield decisive influence in international affairs.
Therefore, Australia’s best chance to achieve its national interests lies in the construction of an international and a regional order in which there are institutional avenues for us to make our voices heard and make substantive contributions, and in which, well developed and high-quality rules and institutions would determine strategic and economic outcomes, rather than raw power and coercion.

In my personal assessment, these interests can be translated more concretely into the construction of a particular type of regional order, which serves three discrete purposes:

i. Major powers avoid armed conflict and all states share a commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes.
ii. All states retain the independence and autonomy to engage in maritime commerce and other forms of economic engagement to promote positive, inclusive and broad-based economic development; and
iii. Rules, institutions and other mechanisms are developed to promote:
   o Equal rights and participation for all states, large or small;
   o Security cooperation to address the challenges created by complex and deep interdependence between states, including in the security domain (terrorism, piracy, humanitarian) and the environment (resource management, climate change).

Perhaps the major theme of my remarks is the idea that a nation like Australia, with a lengthy history of contributing towards multilateral diplomacy and rules-based order, is well positioned to empathise, and potentially advice and assist, other smaller states in the IOR in enhancing their agencies to shape their external environment and protect their own decision-making autonomy.

C. Challenges

Multiple nation-states share our interests in a secure and prosperous Indian Ocean Region.

But it is a region experiencing very rapid change - the rise of China and India are of course at the heart of this change and the increasing focus of the international community on the IOR, in addition to a substantial rise in seaborne trade and other types of connections that are increasingly binding nation-states together.

This change is creating growing challenges:

- Increasing geostrategic and geo-economic competition between major powers:
- India, China and the United States generate a degree of concern among smaller Indian Ocean states.
  o Biggest fear of course is that geostrategic competition becomes more intense, creating the possibility of an arms race, or open hostility/conflict, perhaps caused by miscalculation.
  o Another concern is on the impact of geostrategic and geo-economic competition on the autonomy or the agency of smaller states—their capacity to make their own decisions and shape their external environment.

- Cooperation challenges generated by complex and deep economic interdependence between states mentioned earlier. These include non-traditional security challenges; resource management and the environment; climate change. Such complexity and depth mean, solutions must come through multilateral cooperation.
- Diverse set of interests of littoral states and non-littoral states that are nevertheless users of the sea lanes and have other associated interests.
• Regional order that is less developed than in the Asia-Pacific – less dense networks of communication, cooperation and joint action. Historical reasons for this, such as the lighter footprint of the United States in the post-war order (no alliance system) and a preference of non-aligned countries to promote an IOR free of superpower involvement.
• Significant and not sufficiently met demand for economic development – this development must be sustainable and inclusive, but it’s important to remember that durable solutions provide pathways not only to stability, security and autonomy, but also prosperity.

D. Tasks / Mechanisms

1. Articulation of respective visions, search for common purpose.
2. Focus on the development of various means of diplomacy and order building to implement the shared agenda
3. Increase the resilience, capability and diplomatic energy of small and middle powers.

1. From respective visions to a common purpose

I get the sense that individual states are still sorting out their respective interests, compared with East Asia, where nation-states, arguably, have a clearer idea of what they want—even if they cannot agree—and the trade-offs involved. The speed of change of the IOR strategic landscape has certainly caught me by surprise.

If each participant states can articulate its vision for a regional order for the IOR – find commonalities, talk through differences to understand fault lines, that can seed the agreement of a common purpose – I see this as an important primary goal of the forthcoming Pathfinder Indian Ocean Security Conference, and why I would encourage it to be Track 1.5.

Coming up with a comprehensive question involves providing answers or at least perspectives on some hard questions, such as:

• To what extent should India remain the strategic anchor, or the leader of the region?
• How can China be included, and given an important role in regional mechanisms of cooperation and governance? How can growing Chinese power and influence—which is an undeniable fact—be channelled in ways that increase regional trust and confidence?
• What kind of model of US involvement will be most welcomed by other IOR states? Can and should Washington be a core piece of regional security architecture without being perceived as targeting Beijing or for that matter any other state?
• How can a model of regional leadership, whichever and however each of the big three powers is involved, can be sustainably consultative with smaller/medium powers in the region?
• To what extent does each state want binding rules and institutions, or does it prefer light-touch, more consensus-driven forums?
• How should the transnational and diverse challenges of interdependence – from piracy to technology to the Blue Economy be prioritised?

There is of course no single answer to these questions – but each state needs to be willing to articulate a perspective on these issues, if a robust order is to be negotiated and emerge.
2. Diplomacy and order building: Middle/smaller powers

The mantra here is increased participation in mechanisms that foster dialogue, develop rules, institutions and norms, and embrace participation of all states.

The point is, for individual middle/smaller states to increase their sense of agency over these issues, acknowledging that they have much less capacity to shape interactions between major powers.

Smaller states can cooperate amongst themselves, and they can bring bilateral influence to bear on major powers. The idea is to establish patterns of behaviour and principles of joint action that can, over time, lead to the development of an open, rules-based and increasingly multilateral framework.

- This is a “bottom-up” strategy – frameworks agreed bilaterally or mini-laterally, can be expanded outwards.
  - Agree with Amb. Menon. “issue-based coalitions of the willing”.
- Start with low-hanging fruit – maritime awareness, resource management – and use that to construct the bases for cooperation on other issues.
  - Amb Menon: “establish habits of cooperation”.

Bottom-up cooperation is one pathway to resolving the problem of under-developed regional architecture, which is needed to develop strong rules, institutions and norms to manage these challenges.

- The ultimate goal should be regional, mechanisms, but the pathways to these might involve cooperation at the mini-lateral and bilateral forums – but which is structured explicitly to be a first-step towards broader and more inclusive cooperation.
- Can also be developed using existing mechanisms such as Indian Ocean Rim Association (21 member states)

As already highlighted, a potential focus of smaller and middle powers could be on developing individual resilience to maintain sovereignty and become a more confident and active participant in regional diplomacy.

3. Australian contribution

What kind of contribution can Australia make?

We don’t have vast material resources at our disposal – we can’t single-handedly create a stable security environment or offer large-scale support for economic development. But we can be an active participant and advocate for multilateral mechanisms, and we can engage in dialogue and partner with smaller states regarding approaches to institution building and participation.

- Technical expertise:
  - E.g. the design and operation of major infrastructure projects;
  - Bureaucratic training and capacity building within domestic institutions.
  - Stewardship of maritime resources.
- Australia’s participation in some projects, even as a junior partner, may also be seen as constructive by some Indian Ocean countries that would prefer to broaden the stakeholders in politically sensitive projects.
Diversifying the participants in these projects could truly be a win-win for all concerned. Australia needs to consider how it can work with both Japan and China in particular, in promoting open and sustainable projects across the region.

4. Conclusions

A lot of work has to be done, but this provides an opportunity for considered thinking and negotiations regarding what kind of model of regional order is possible and desirable. With this model, I see merit in smaller and medium powers being actively engaged in the construction of that order and see facilitating the increased agency of these nation-states as being an important area, where Australia can make a contribution.
2. A Chinese Perspective on “Indo-Pacific Region”: Interests, Challenges and Responses
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Abstract

Despite not located in the Indian Ocean Region, the People’s Republic of China has important interests. These include, ensuring the Maritime Silk Road program (one of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)), maintaining safe and secure sea lanes and choke-points, keeping rule-based maritime order. The ‘free and open Indo-Pacific policy’ of the US is the extension of Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy to the Indian Ocean region but a sharper policy framework targeting China. This presentation paper explains how these interests, difficulties and challenges are met by China and how China would respond to such situations.

Keyword: Indo-Pacific, Indian Ocean Region, Maritime Security, China

Introduction

China is an Asia-Pacific country, but not a country in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). However, a geographical entity beyond the IOR could not be defined with strategic indifference. China has several important national interests in the IOR because at least China like other countries outside the region is a major user of IO. These include ensuring the safety of sea-lanes and chokepoints, managing marine environment, maintaining maritime stability and security. The most important consideration is how to prevent the Maritime Silk Road (MSR, one of Belt and Road Initiatives, BRI) from any negative activities.

The IOR has seldom been stable, but a region of big powers’ competition. The new terminology, the Indo-Pacific Region, produces challenges for the users of the IO, including China. The author tries to identify challenges China might confront. These include potential anti-China organizations, provocative activities against BRI, and non-state actors such as militants, terrorist actions etc. within the Indian Ocean. The presentation will also touch on Chinese effort to respond. China has not yet adopted a comprehensive policy to the Indo-Pacific region concept or the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s diplomatic strategy focuses on win-win cooperation and aims at establishing a safe and secure maritime environment. China does not intend to set up old fashioned alliance, but friendship circles for economic development. China has made efforts to enhance the Indo-Pacific, particularly stability of the IOR. China is not only supporting but also wants to maintain the current international, including the IOR, maritime order. That means, China is supporting a rules-based maritime order. China takes steps within its capabilities to assist IOR countries to improve their facilities. With those said, some Chinese experts have also discussed how to find out some ways to bridge the gap between FOIP and BRI.

Ensuring Maritime Silk Road

First, China’s interest in the IOR is implementing new Maritime Silk Road (MSR), one of the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), which was launched in 2013. President Xi Jinping has stated that the BRI can be seen as an opportunity to promote transnational interconnection and improve trade and investment cooperation.

Countries along the line of the IOR are coastal states and they are all potential participants of the MSR. MSR has several basic connotations. One point is that MSR is in harmony with the blue economy, which is consistent with China’s domestic development strategy increasingly looking at the ocean. One of the functions of Maritime Silk Road is actually to implement the country’s 13th five-year plan (2016-20) in the maritime domain to develop marine

1 Views expressed here are his own of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of Shanghai Institutes for International Studies or the China’s government.
and blue economy. The second is to promote industrial capacity cooperation. The third is to preserve marine environment and the fourth but not the last is to improve local infrastructure facilities including ports.

In the past five years, numerous MSR projects have been undertaken but one of the challenges has been the United States and the Western countries attacking China’s action as new imperialism and MSR projects as “debt traps” etc. China’s diplomatic spokespersons have responded by rejecting the irresponsible remarks in particular that was made by Vice President of the United States (remarks at Hudson Institute on October 4, 2018 and at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Papua New Guinea in November 2018). China understands that Infrastructure projects do not provide tangible returns for both sides in the short term, but China continues to support MSR partners in the region and work with them to advance their development capabilities. Another criticism is the recent increase of China’s naval vessels in the IO. My personal view is that the blue economy and the naval activities belongs to two different categories. MSR could be a strategy for blue economy but not necessarily a blue naval strategy.

**Maintaining safe and secure sea-lanes and choke-points**

Another interest of China is having safe and secure sea lanes and choke-points in the IO. More than five years have passed since 2013, but the BRI progress seems unbalanced between MSR and Silk Road Economic Belt. MSR confronts more difficulties or challenges, mainly because of the critical maritime environment. One significant issue is how to maintain the sea lanes of communication (SLOCS) and safety and stability of chokepoints. Given China’s fast economic growth, the country needs to have sufficient energy traffic in the IO as well as the Pacific Ocean. The safe SLOCs are very important for China. Any unsafe and unstable situation at sea could hurt China’s “far sea” commercial transportation. Pirate activities have had threats to oceanic shipping, particularly in the Bay of Aden. So do terrorists’ activities. The energy-related facilities have been the targets of terrorist attacks. The world has not forgotten the Abqaiq attack\(^i\) in early 2006 and the Mumbai attack in 2008\(^ii\). The transportation safety along the SLOCs of the IO has also become a serious maritime security issue for policy and military analysts in China. They are now considering how best to cope with the possibility of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and SLOC security across the Indian Ocean and around Southeast Asia to China.

**Maintaining rule-based maritime order**

China has no intention of changing the reality of current maritime security architecture and order. Any remarks referred to China as “revisionist” are not correct and naturally could not be accepted. China like many developing countries along the MSR line suffered a lot from more than a century of foreign interference but rose from poverty after taking part and engaging with current international economic system. China has no intention to destroy post-War II international system including the maritime order, which is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Five principles of peaceful co-existence have been advocated by China and India. China upholds international sea laws including the UNCLOS to solve disputes. China does not reject freedom of navigation under the UNCLOS, but does not authorize other States to carry out /in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or maneuvers, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives without the consent of the coastal countries? Therefore, China, like some countries in the IOR, would not permit military operations within its EEZs and the continental shelf without prior notification or approval.

**Observation on Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy**

The Indo-Pacific strategy is not only for maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific region, but also to extend and enhance that presence in the IOR. In the previous strategy of rebalance to Asia, the Obama

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Administration had committed to sending most advanced capabilities in the Asia Pacific and about 60% naval and air forces will be based in the Pacific by 2020. With this new terminology, the Trump Administration tries to borrow the name of like-minded democratic states and form a new group as a counterbalance against rising China. One of the U.S. officials from the Department of State stated that the Indo-Pacific concept is to encourage India to play a special role in the Asia Pacific. That could be interpreted as pushing India to a position to confront China and keep China out of the Indian Ocean. The U.S. is also mobilizing other democratic countries in the IOR to counter against China. That is different from the Obama Administration, which tried to maintain an engagement with China. Trump Administration seems to decouple the relations with China and put pressure on China from almost all angles. I wonder if this strategy can be accepted. China does not regard the U.S. as an enemy, but China is being made an enemy. China’s BRI is contributing to the regional development. If the U.S. and its allies have self-confidence, the U.S. should welcome China’s efforts for infrastructure building in the IOR.

Options for big powers’ competition

Firstly, China and other stakeholders including the U. S. should work to better appreciate each other’s interests regarding the IOR. China respects the sovereignty of the countries in the IOR, respects interests of other countries in the region. China has a basic request that China’s interests in the IOR should be respected.

Secondly, China and the U. S. should collaborate on building of infrastructure in the IOR. I believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy of the U. S. is likely to exacerbate China’s concerns because it makes China an enemy. But China does not look at the U. S. as a rival and enemy. We want China and the U.S. to engage in collaborative effort to make friendly circles in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. China and the U.S. have common and huge interests in maintaining stable and secure Indian Ocean Region as well as in the Pacific Ocean.

Thirdly, big powers should consult each other or together construct a rule-based maritime order in the IOR. We already have rule-based international laws governing the seas in the form of UNCLOS. But with the new situation, we need to consider establishing rule-based maritime order in the IOR. First step can start from think tanks. We would like to cooperate with Sri Lanka, India as well as others to engage in that task.

Fourthly, one urgent issue is to reduce the chances of unintended conflict, particularly between the United States and China in Asia maritime region as well as in other regions. Both sides should follow relevant international agreements including the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. Other methods too should be pursued to avoid conflicts in the region.
3. **French Perspectives on Maritime Security and Governance in the Indian Ocean**  
**Dr. Frédéric Grare**  
*Charge de Mission Asie, Center d’Analyse de Prévision et de Stratégie*

A. **Defining the issue**

As a littoral state of the Indian Ocean, French perspectives on the maritime security in the IOR are shaped by two sets of considerations:

i). Concerns about the freedom of navigation. The Indian Ocean is a maritime access to Asia. From this perspective, French concerns are no different from those of any other countries, whose trade depends on the sea lanes of communications that cross the region.

ii). Concerns about the protection of its populations, territories and interests in the South West and South of the Indian Ocean. There, one should consider all the threats previously enumerated but also illegal immigration and more generally all nefarious activities likely to affect the food security and well-being in the present and the future. This is where environmental security is relevant.

As such, France is confronted across the Indian Ocean with all traditional and non-traditional threats (piracy, terrorism, trafficking of all kinds, military presence and competition), which all affect the security of sea lanes of communication. In the Horn of Africa alone, for example, 103 incidents were identified in 2018.

The Indian Ocean is clearly a region in a strategic flux. The center of gravity of maritime has shifted eastwards, which has attracted extra-regional powers to the IOR. This has led to an increased naval presence, largely justified by the huge geo-economic stakes in the region. Within this increasingly difficult geostrategic context, the safety of France’s maritime domain (26% of the French EEZ is in the Indian Ocean) and of the high seas are major issues.

Yet, the naval traffic alone does not make the Indian Ocean a playing field for the various regional and extra-regional powers. Every stakeholder has an interest in maintaining the sea lanes of communications open.

The direct and most immediate threats remain in fact low level, relatively localized and often close to shores. The issue therefore is as much about maintaining the traditional protection of the sea lanes of communications than protecting maritime based economic resources. Although the two categories may overlap, this is a fundamental difference.

It also has practical implications. It means that maritime security in the Indian Ocean is perhaps as much about capacity-building as it is about naval deployment. This does not diminish the reality of any other kind of threats, nor the need for naval deployments of all kind, including coast guards, it simply indicates that there are other threats that should be addressed. As these threats tend to be less political by nature, although they can be highly sensitive, they offer perhaps more space for cooperative regimes and mechanisms, (at least in principle). The preservation of marine ecosystems should in particular:

- Bring together all stakeholders within a multilateral approach of the Indian Ocean;
- Bring cohesion to the Indian Ocean by offering the littoral states a cooperative way of reinforcing their own (strategic) autonomy.

B. **Environmental threats to maritime security**

Of all the threats which affect maritime security, environmental security issues are probably the least considered, although they do affect all other dimensions of security. Droughts, floods, rising water and more generally
consequences of climate change are not just natural events. They redraw maps, displace populations and create new tensions.

**The impact of climate change**

One cannot overemphasize the importance of climate change on human security in the Indian Ocean Region. Africa, Asia and the wider IOR are sharing a disproportionate burden of climate change.

Ocean sea levels are rising unevenly and threaten densely populated areas and islands. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report for example, estimated a sea level rise of 0.18 to 0.59 meters by the end of the 21st Century with the consequent risk of loss of arable land. In Bangladesh alone, a 45 cm sea level rise would inundate almost 10.9% of the national territory and would displace 5.5 million people of the coastal region. It would also dramatically affect food security due to the loss of crop, water scarcity. More generally, the Indian Ocean is also the region with the highest number of countries and population at risk. Climate change may also render the Indian Ocean nations vulnerable to stronger and more frequent storm surges. As such, it entails a high risk of damage to coastal infrastructure. The risk is therefore real of high scale migration.

Climate change could also act as a major catalyst for maritime disputes: The rising sea levels threaten low-lying islands in the Indian Ocean leading to disputes over the Exclusive Economic zones.

From a military perspective, it is also a threat to naval operations and infrastructures. In other words, climate change is not an abstract notion. It could be the source of huge revolutions, of dramatic geopolitical changes.

**Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing**

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is another important issue. The depletion of fishing resources for example hinders the resilience of states and generates other security problem. Piracy off the coast of Somalia was the outcome of overfishing long before it became a matter of organized crime. It can take many forms, from the most benign to the most organized, including state sponsored. But it is always destructive for the biodiversity and the environment. Moreover, illegal, unreported and illegal fishing practices are taking place in all parts of the Indian Ocean.

State resilience is not the only stake. Illegal fishing is implicated in a range of other maritime “crimes”. It overlaps with drug, human, weapon and other contraband trafficking and illegal immigration. In that sense, illegal fishing precipitates from hybridization of criminal activities.

Unregulated, unreported and illegal fishing also has clear inter-state implications. The straying of fishermen into neighboring country waters is a quite frequent phenomenon in the region. (Fishermen quite naturally tend to follow the fish, not the other way around). It affects the security of fishermen, who often end up in jail, when they are not fired upon by security agencies. But it sometimes leads to much more serious sovereignty issues and national security concerns, when a straying overlap in a more or less organized manner with complex rival claims over EEZs.

C. Improving the governance of the Indian Ocean: some proposals

The Indian Ocean region remains poorly equipped to face this variety of issues. Weak institutionalization characterizes the region, while regional security architecture remains notoriously weak if not non-existent. Yet, it is essential to collectively identify and address the critical vulnerabilities of socio-economic systems, collapse of which would have serious trans-border consequences. Even if partial, there are pragmatic solutions for environmental
security issues, just like there are some for the other threats to security in the region. They could and should be explored.

Addressing normative issues: Elaborating a regulatory framework for the entire Indian Ocean, possibly on the model of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, initially meant to address piracy, but which scope was enlarged in Jeddah to include all illicit maritime activities (including IUU fishing) could be a step in the right direction.

Surveillance of the maritime domain by the littoral states of the Indian Ocean is as central to addressing environmental security issues as it is to addressing other threats. If effective cooperative security primarily requires international and regional norms and regulations it also requires maritime surveillance capabilities and control mechanisms to help implement common rules. Increased cooperation between the various Information Fusion Centers operating in the region would be as useful in fighting piracy, trafficking of all kinds and non-proliferation as it would, combat illegal fishing.

The generalization of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) would be a way to complete the mechanism.

Mutualizing control capabilities when and where possible and desirable could also be a way to address the shortage of capacities, which is affecting parts of the Indian Ocean Region.

The combination of these measures would help ensure the respect of marine protected areas and protection of the biodiversity of maritime spaces.

Encourage transparency: Encourage all stakeholders of the Indian Ocean to become members of the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) or create the equivalent for the Indian Ocean. The Fisheries Transparency Initiative is, sort of a code of good conduct involving States, civil society, partners of development and operators of the fishery sector. It is based on the publication of all related national legislation as well as publication of all fisheries contracts.

Maritime research is a key instrument for maritime security. Establishing networks of maritime research institutes and universities could be a way to integrate the regional scientific community in order and produce better knowledge based on larger data bases. Its impact would go far beyond science alone. Research regarding the evolution of the stocks of fish for example is scientifically important, essential for the sound management of fisheries across the region (for the attribution of fishing licenses for example) but can also be a powerful instrument for professional organization and the larger civil society for an effective monitoring of their government actions and the preservation of their own interests from the predation of the external actors of the fishing industry.

In this context, particular attention should be given to climate prediction capabilities. Establishing a network of efficient and reliable meteorological departments across the IOR is critical, not only to facilitate risk informed decision making and initiate action but also for establishing patterns.
4. **Japan’s Approaches to Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific Region**  

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(Personal views only)

At a time when the Indo-Pacific region is emerging as a new geo-strategic center of gravity in the 21st Century world, and especially given the rise of China and India as great powers, and a host of global and regional non-traditional security challenges, it would be imperative that Japan, as a robust democracy and economic and maritime power with global interests, would play a major role in strengthening a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, the evolving strategic environment at sea, characterized by competing territorial and maritime claims and the growing signs of strategic rivalry in US-China relations and India-China relations, presents significant challenges for all the countries, large and small, in the region. The role of the United States remains critical in pursuing “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision”, safeguarding the freedom of navigation and overflight, deterring major conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards. However, the United States alone cannot secure broader security interests of the region. International cooperation and collaboration would be the key to maintaining a stable rules-based maritime security order and governance in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific region.

I propose to discuss two questions. First, what are Japan’s perceptions of maritime security issues? I would focus on intensifying strategic competition among major powers in the Indo-Pacific in general and on maritime security issues in the Bay of Bengal in particular. Second, given Tokyo’s vision of FOIP, what would be Japan’s roles in ensuring maritime security in the 21st century Indo-Pacific?

Before discussing maritime security issues, it would be useful to consider how order is maintained in the present system of sovereign states. In his seminal work, *The Anarchical Society*, Professor Hedley Bull emphasizes the importance of three factors in providing order in international society: common interests, rules which prescribe the pattern of behavior that sustain common interests; and institutions which make these rules effective. Hedley Bull then highlights what he refers to as the institutions of international society: the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the role of the great powers.\textsuperscript{iv}

In the maritime security realm, I would argue, that a favorable balance of power would be crucial in maintaining international order at sea. In more specific terms, the U. S. has been playing a critical role in preventing the domination of the Eurasian continent by any one state or by any combination of states, thus providing a favorable balance of power.\textsuperscript{v}

International laws and organizations, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), “Incidents at Sea Agreements” such as those between the US and Russia, Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Maritime Organization, can fulfill significant functions in securing maritime safety, avoiding incidents at sea, resolving maritime disputes, enhancing maritime domain awareness, and building confidence among the states concerned, thus contributing to maritime security order. Yet, it should be noted that the efficacy and scope of these ‘rules of the game’ remain limited and require further strengthening.

According to Hedley Bull, diplomacy serves a number of important functions in maintaining international order. It facilitates communication between the political leaders of states or other entities in international society. It conducts negotiations for agreements. It plays a role in gathering intelligence and information about foreign countries. It helps to minimize the effects of friction in international relations\(^v\). In the maritime security realm, diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, can serve as a principal vehicle for negotiating agreements on maritime safety, and maritime/territorial disputes between states. It should also be noted that the navy can play a diplomatic role in sending some political and strategic signal to other countries through its presence, or training and exercise with its partners.

It should also be emphasized that the great powers have responsibilities and roles to play in maintaining international norms and a rules-based international order. In the realm of maritime security, it is expected that the great powers play crucial roles in preserving the balance of power, maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight, and the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs), seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and seeking to limit wars among one another, if they occur. Yet given the risks of military escalation and the potentially catastrophic consequences of war, maritime and territorial disputes should be resolved by peaceful means, and military confrontation should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. Should deterrence fail and a war occur, either accidentally or intentionally, it should be limited and contained, and should be terminated with the minimum costs incurred.

Japan’s security perceptions reflect its position as a major maritime power with global interests, an ally of the United States, and an increasingly proactive contributor to world peace. Although Japan has managed to deter and defend against any threat of aggression for the last 70 years since the end of the Second World War, its perceptions of physical vulnerabilities remain extremely profound. Japan is a geographically small country with densely populated cities, natural disaster-prone conditions, and rapidly aging and shrinking population, yet it is located in a geo-strategically important Northeast Asia, where major powers such as China and Russia and even North Korea are all nuclear-armed and with significant power projection capabilities. And Japan is critically dependent on international trade and the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) for its survival.

Japan has an abiding and intrinsic interest in maintaining a rules-based maritime order where “the rule of law at sea” is respected and observed. Japan also has a strategic and economic interest in keeping its sea lanes of communication open and secure for its survival. Japan’s National Security Strategy put it as: “sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East.”\(^vi\)

When we look at what has been going on in this region, I think it is fair to say that the Indo-Pacific is an idea whose time has come. We witness today the increasing political, economic and strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific, and the dynamism of connectivity between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and Africa and Asia. We also notice growing strategic competition between the U.S. and China, and between India and China. Great-power competition is a matter of considerable concern to all the countries, because some small incident caused by miscalculation at the tactical level, say an armed clash in the East and South China Seas or the Indian Ocean, could inadvertently escalate to large-scale, unexpected military conflict. The potential of inadvertent escalation may well persist, if the current trends continue in the region. Indeed, Graham Allison argues in his book titled Destined For

\(^v\) Bull, ibid., pp. 162-183.
War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? That “China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war – unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it.”

In more general terms, the prospect for arms race, especially in the maritime domain, appears to be looming large in the minds of policymakers and strategists in the region. Indeed, driven by economic growth, perceived security imperatives and rising nationalism, many countries in the region have embarked on increasing their defense budgets and building up their military capabilities. If there is substantial evidence that an arms race, especially in the maritime domain, is in the making, it can be argued that it would stimulate further tensions and increase the prospect for conflict, because action-reaction dynamics, if not managed or controlled, could generate its own momentum.

When it comes to the Bay of Bengal, we observe that there are increasingly significant yet still widely underestimated maritime security and governance challenges. First, the Bay of Bengal and its littoral states remain ill-prepared for disasters, both natural and humanitarian, as manifested in the 2004 tsunami and more recently the massive Rohingya migrations. Hence, there is an urgent need for an institutional mechanism in which policymakers and researchers and aid specialists conduct not only disaster management but also disaster risk management, network-building, information sharing and dissemination, something like the HADR center proposed by Sri Lanka at the “Trincomalee Consultations 2018”.

Second, the Bay of Bengal also requires an institutional mechanism for enhancing maritime domain awareness, something like the MDA, also recommended by Sri Lanka at the “Trincomalee Consultations 2018”.

Third, the specter of terrorism and political upheaval remains a challenge facing the Bay of Bengal countries. Kent Calder observes, “The Bay of Bengal was once a coherent political-economic unit, and a variety of broad global pressures have begun to support increased regional interdependence once again. Yet domestic political uncertainties, ethnic tensions, and incipient geopolitical conflict between India and China threaten to impede that integrative process.”

Fourth, given the requirements for HA/DR, maritime security and governance, the Bay of Bengal nations need to further develop capabilities in terms of not only equipment such as patrol ships but also human resources and technical expertise.

Fifth, the Bay of Bengal and its littoral states can play a significant part in the context of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision and China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative. In this respect, what we want would not be a rivalry between Japan and China but creative, multi-lateral, and inclusive cooperation and collaboration among the countries concerned.

What are Japan’s roles for maritime security and governance in the Indo-Pacific region?

According to Japan’s National Security Strategy, Japan is keen to “promote regional efforts and play a leading role in creating a shared recognition that reinforcement of the maritime order governed by law and rules and not by coercion is indispensable for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole.”

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xi Ibid., pp.45.

I would argue that Japan’s approach to maritime security and governance would include the following elements:

First, it is important for Japan to further improve its maritime security capabilities to deter aggression and coercion by enhancing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and Coast Guard capabilities.

Second, Tokyo needs to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. by upgrading the alliance roles, missions and capabilities, and also by collaborating efforts to tackle a host of challenges confronting the Bay of Bengal mentioned earlier.

Third, Tokyo needs to enhance its bilateral, trilateral and multi-lateral security cooperation with its partners. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Japan-China relationship has been significantly improving. Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang agreed when they met in Beijing in October last year that the two countries would create a new framework to jointly move ahead with infrastructure projects in third countries. At the outset of their meeting, Prime Minister told Premier Li “Switching from competition to collaboration, I want to lift Japan-China relations to a new era. Japan and China are neighbors and partners. We will not become a threat to each other.”

Fourth, Tokyo needs to continue its efforts to build FOIP norms, rules and mechanisms such as confidence building measures (CBM), crisis management, and arms control norms. Japan could play political and diplomatic roles in institutionalizing and operationalizing “three principles on the rule of law at sea.” As Prime Minister Abe put it in his speech at Shangri-La Dialogue in 2014, “The first principle is that states shall make their claims based on international law. The second is that states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims. The third principle is that states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. So to reiterate this, it means making claims that are faithful in light of international law, not resorting to force or coercion, and resolving all disputes through peaceful means.”

Japan’s diplomatic support for ASEAN in SCS Code of Conduct should be continued. International laws and institutions, including the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), the WPNS Code of Un-alerted Encounters at Sea (CUES), and arms control measures such as Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) should be enhanced. An effective Japan-China crisis management mechanism, and possibly Japan-U.S.-China trilateral crisis management mechanism should be established.

Fifth, Japan will continue to promote its capacity building measures directed at the Bay of Bengal littoral states and ASEAN countries, including provision of patrol vessels to Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Sixth, Tokyo needs to continue its efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness including possible use of automatic identification system (AIS) satellites for maritime domain awareness, developing regional network and especially the connectivity between the Bay of Bengal and the Pacific.

Finally, but not least important, Tokyo continues to support regional associations such as IORA, IONS, the Galle Dialogue, BIMSTEC, SAARC, WPNS, ADMM Plus to address non-traditional maritime security challenges such as HA/DR, international terrorism, piracy, and cyber security, including the issues related to vulnerable under-sea communication cables in the oceans.

Let me conclude by saying that Japan will play a major role in strengthening a rules-based maritime security order in the Indo-Pacific region. At the end of the day, great-power strategic competition, confrontation and conflicts should be avoided at all costs. It would be imperative, therefore, for the major powers including the U.S., India, Japan, China and other significant stakeholders in the region such as Sri Lanka to share the responsibilities in shaping a new security order in the Indo-Pacific region.

5. Perspectives from Norway

Mr. Christian Ruge
Programme Director, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF)

Thank you for this opportunity to take part in this discussion. I will have to start with some caveats; I am not an expert on the Indian Ocean Region, NOREF is a process-oriented centre focusing on conflict resolution and finally, these are of course observations made in a personal capacity.

A Norwegian perspective on maritime security and stability inevitably builds on well-established rules and practices of existing International Law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS. This convention, and the way it has been implemented by States Parties and the related adjudication and sanctions architecture provides the legal, regulatory and normative framework for addressing any issue related to management and protection of maritime resources, freedom of navigation and delineation of relevant trade and sovereignty zones.

It is only by respecting, promoting and further develop the rule of law, applicable to all states and other relevant actors, that the International community can regulate and protect maritime resources, ensure peace and security at the seas, address the pollution of the seas and secure free, and secure maritime free-trade, necessary for further development of a sustainable blue economy development.

While UNCLOS was negotiated and concluded in quite different global political and economic context than we face today, it has proved itself to be remarkable resilient and relevant. One illustration of this is how the Convention provided the framework for a rational, evidence-based and orderly process to delineate the continental shelves of Member States, a process that due to its potential for significant economic prospects for each state easily could have become a zero-sum game, where naval might dictated outcomes.

And other illustration of how UNCLOS, and the precedents that have evolved from it since its entry into force, still bears relevance, are the measures ensuring freedom of navigation and thus underpinning vital international trade. Without this regulatory and normative framework, these trade patterns would be under a much stronger protectionist pressure than is observed today.

Norway is a small state, with a long coastline and with a continental shelf significantly larger than its above-the-sea landmass. Exports of oil, gas and fish constitute critical elements of its economy. Norway is also a small country, which is located in a geopolitically sensitive area. Norway shares a land-border with Russia, who in turn has one of its most important naval bases not far from the border, including one of the main bases for its strategic nuclear submarines. Russia and Norway also share maritime and off-shore resources. Following four decades of ongoing negotiations over how to formally delineate the borders in the Barents Sea, a bilateral treaty, firmly based on principles of international law, was signed in 2010 and ratified the year after by both states.

Both these examples illustrate why a principled, rules-based management regime is vital to small and medium maritime states. And maybe also to large states, as it reduces uncertainty in what is often sensitive areas. Such a regime also enables long-term thinking in resource management and planning, as it ensures predictability for all actors. Looking ahead at the significant challenges posed by protection of global fish-stocks and combatting maritime pollution, which have local effects but global roots and thus warrants both local and global measures, an effective multilateral approach is the only rational way forward.

On a different level, and more relevant for the Indian Ocean region, was the EU-driven anti-piracy operation Atalanta in the Bay of Aden. This is an example of how the international community can come together for decisive and concerted action to combat an urgent and localized maritime security-problem, within a clear
framework of international law. The mandate of the Atalanta operation was firmly based on a series of UN Security Council Resolutions and implemented by a regional organization with contributions from a broad group of member states. Norway contributed with one Frigate for parts of the operation.

So without knowing the many aspects of security and stability issues on the IOR, my general advice for structuring a discussion on these issues would be to base them on established rules, principles and practices of International Law, in particular the UNCLOS and other international instruments aimed at addressing other relevant security issues, including Illegal and Unregulated fisheries, piracy, human trafficking and slavery, to mention some. From that basis it should be relevant and possible to identify needs and gaps in existing instruments, including differentiating between normative gaps and implementations gaps, and then examine how to address them most effectively.

As mentioned in the beginning, NOREF is a process-oriented centre, and I therefore take the liberty to provide some observations on that aspect.

It is our experience that a systematic approach to inclusivity and diversity of expertise and opinions are keys to the success of such an undertaking. That does not mean that absolutely all thinkable actors should be invited, but that you as organisers are aware of the pitfalls created by possible cognitive blind spots when planning such events and take measures to mitigate them.

For instance, this meeting in the IAG is dominated by men in a certain age bracket, representing academic expertise. Contrast this to the knowledge and analysis that rests with women and youth, and with representatives from communities whose existence and livelihood is directly affected by changing sea levels, dwindling fish-stocks and economic predators exploiting legal or regulatory loopholes, to mention some examples. Most probably – these groups will have different views on both what constitute problems and how best to address them.

So, while it is vital to secure participation from all coastal states in the region, ensuring a broader knowledge- and experience basis than state-based representativity can do, will make the discussions more relevant and attuned to the lived realities of many more.

Finally, I would like to echo what has been brought forward by others around this table regarding the broader policy context. It is a crowded field of initiatives, workshops and conferences on these issues. The seas are getting increased attention. While it is important to plan for a conference that brings up key issues, that bring together relevant expertise and facilitate discussions, so they stay relevant to the issues, the conference itself is a means to an end. Thus, it is important, in my experience, not only to think about this as one conference in isolation from other initiatives, but as a contribution to ongoing international and national policy and knowledge dynamics already shaping these agendas, and that will continue to shape them both during and after this conference. So, you as organisers need to think hard and smart on how this conference can shape the national, regional and international agendas relevant for these issues in the best way.

I thank you for your attention.
6. Russia and the Indian Ocean Security and Governance
Ms. Ksenia Kuzmina
Program Manager – South Asia and Asia Pacific, Russian International Affairs Council

(The views expressed herein are personal of the author and do not reflect those of RIAC and Russia's official position.)

Russia is located far from the Indian Ocean, but the region has always played an important role in the country's strategy. During the Soviet times, Moscow maintained steady presence in the Indian Ocean, including naval presence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, its attention to the region decreased due to internal reasons. However, since the last decade Moscow has come back to the Indian Ocean, which manifests for example, in Russian naval ships conducting anti-piracy operations near the coasts of Africa. At the same time, having limited trade and security relations in the region, Russia is often seen as playing only a marginal role or no part at all in the Indian Ocean's affairs. However, Russia as a global power, has vital economic and strategic interests tied to the region. As part of its “Pivot to the East” strategy, Russia regards developing stronger and diversified ties with regional players in all areas ranging from strategic to trade or scientific, as one of its foreign policy priorities.

At the official level, one strategic document – ‘Russia's Maritime Doctrine till 2020’ - specifically deals with the country's interests in the region. Russia's Maritime Doctrine till 2020 views the Indian Ocean as one of regional priorities and formulates three long-term objectives of the Russian policy in the region: a) developing shipping and fisheries navigation as well as joint anti-piracy activities with other states; b) conducting marine scientific research in Antarctica as the main policy direction aimed at maintaining and strengthening Russia's positions in the region; and c) promoting the transformation of the region into a zone of peace, stability and good neighborly relations as well as periodically ensuring naval presence of the Russian Federation in the Indian Ocean.

Moscow's main interests and concerns in the Indian Ocean are connected both to traditional phenomena characteristic to the region and altering regional dynamics. From the strategic point of view, the Indian Ocean is increasingly seen as an arena of a “great game”, an area of competition between great powers. Those competing are China and the US, or China and India. In this context, conceptualization and institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific as well as India - Japan initiative of Asia - Africa Growth Corridor are often viewed as manifestations of this power game, coming after China's attempts to involve regional players into the Belt and Road Initiative that is often seen as not an economic initiative but rather a geostrategic plan. Importantly, smaller regional states, including Sri Lanka, might be increasingly used as playing fields or even bargaining chips in this great powers' game.

Transformation of the Indian Ocean in an arena of confrontation is surely against Moscow's interests. First, any conflict or severe tensions of such a scale in the area as important as Indian Ocean will have long-lasting repercussions not only for the region’s security and prosperity but for the whole world and would eventually affect Russia. Second, Moscow maintains close relations with both Delhi and Beijing, and being forced to choose between these two strategic partners is a worst-case scenario for Russia. In light of this, Moscow could, to a certain extent, use regular meetings in Russia - India - China strategic triangle format to somewhat ease the tensions and contribute to bridging the gap between Delhi and Beijing.

Traditional security threats coming from non-state actors - piracy, terrorism, drug-trafficking etc., continue to give reason for Moscow's concern. They are now exacerbated by the emergence of new means of communication or attack linked to the technological revolution - for example, artificial intelligence and robotics technologies. Ensuring digital security in the Indian Ocean is no less important now, with regional states being increasingly susceptible for cyber-attacks. In this context the need for security and safety of deep-water cables is also worth mentioning. At the same time, recent technological developments create new opportunities for cooperation and new instruments allowing to tackle existing challenges more efficiently.
Another set of issues worth Moscow’s attention deal with the fact that a lot of regional countries have fast growing populations that may have a significant effect on global migration flows and potentially give rise to food and water security challenges. This could at the same time give Moscow new opportunities for cooperation with regional players and prevent unrest.

Last but not least, the Indian Ocean is faced with a number of environmental challenges that affect all other development factors and challenges and will significantly alter the geostrategic and geo-economic map of the region and the world as a whole in the years to come.

Altering regional dynamics and growing instability call for closer cooperation between regional states; it should also involve non-regional actors. Regional situation determines the need for developing common approaches and joint actions in order to develop a multilateral, inclusive, non-confrontational order based on mutual respect and international law. Smaller states’ strategic autonomy is to be ensured. For Moscow, role of fundamental principles of international law (including United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and non-exclusive multilateral institutions, both global and regional (first and foremost, the United Nations), is intrinsic in this context.

A certain lack of institutional framework is characteristic for the region, there is no regional security architecture as such. While rigid and binding collaboration mechanisms are unlikely to be formed in the Indian Ocean in short- to mid-term, it is vital to develop and reinforce dialogue platforms and collaborative frameworks, stimulate transparent and inclusive dialogue and strengthen confidence-building measures. Russia with its long history of multilateral diplomacy could provide great support to regional multilateral dialogue frameworks. In the longer term, developing and promoting such initiatives would also contribute to Russia’s Greater Eurasia Initiative.

As to more practical issues, given its ample defense capacities, Russia could also serve as a security provider in the region with regard to anti-piracy, anti-terrorism and anti-trafficking and assist regional states in developing their own capacities in these areas. The Russian navy could also contribute to disaster-relief operations in the Indian Ocean. Moscow’s great technical and scientific potential could also make it a contributor to regional digital security and safety of critical infrastructure.

It is also interesting to look at a potential Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s role in the region. Its scope has been traditionally limited to Central Asia, but with India and Pakistan joining as full members and Sri Lanka as a dialogue partner, the Indian Ocean also has now entered its scope. Of course, it is too early to argue that the SCO can become an important player in the region, but it could serve as one of the dialogue platforms and, given its anti-terrorist component, share expertise on fighting non-state security challenges.

These ambitious strategic and practical tasks cannot be achieved by cooperation at the official level alone, without contribution by civil societies, businesses, expert communities, and think tanks of regional and non-regional countries. Interested 1.5 and 2-track dialogues also serve to promote mutual understanding in interests of peaceful development.
7. The Indian Ocean and Small States – The Case of Singapore, Mr Hernaikh Singh, Senior Associate Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

Background

The maritime routes of the Indian Ocean have traditionally determined the flow of goods, people and ideas, connecting Asia with Europe and Africa. Today, according to the Indian Ocean Rim Association, half the world’s container ships, one-third of its bulk cargo traffic, two-thirds of its oil shipments and more than 50 per cent of the world’s maritime oil trade pass through the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{xiv} The consequential effect has been for countries with vested interest and concerns to find the necessary means and platforms to protect the sea lines of the Indian Ocean.

Along with these, there are many other non-traditional security challenges with global implications and causes that have compelled countries to cooperate and international organisations to call for urgent action. These include pollution in the Indian Ocean, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, climate change, and the trafficking of people and drugs.\textsuperscript{xv}

There are ample literature and discussions on political, economic and strategic developments in the Indian Ocean. However, these have generally concentrated on the interests and concerns of key stakeholder countries. Less is written on the interest of small states which feature marginally on the strategic contours of the key stakeholder countries.

Importance of Maritime Trade for Singapore

For Singapore, a tiny city state and a port, free trade constitutes three times its gross domestic product.

Singapore is strategically located along the key global shipping routes. About 70 per cent of the world’s global maritime economy transits through the Singapore Strait. The island state boasts of being the busiest trans-shipment hub in the world. Its annual sea cargo movement is 1,350 times than that by air.\textsuperscript{xvi} The maritime industry employs more than 170,000 people and accounts for seven per cent of Singapore’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\textsuperscript{xvii}

In 2017, Singapore’s container throughput grew by nine per cent to 33.7 million Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) from 30.9 million TEUs in 2016. This was largely due to improvements in global trade growth and the repositioning of major shipping alliances. At almost 34 million TEUs, Singapore is the top Indian Ocean container port. Dubai is a distant second at 15 million TEUs followed by Port Klang in Malaysia at 13 million TEUs.\textsuperscript{xviii}


\textsuperscript{xv} Ib. ibid.


Annually, more than 130,000 ships call at Singapore and at any time, there are about 1,000 vessels in the Singapore port. The Singapore Registry of Ships (SRS) is amongst the top five largest ship registries in the world. Today, the SRS has over 4,500 vessels registered with it.\textsuperscript{xix}

These figures clearly illustrate the significance of maritime trade, security and governance for Singapore. The maritime dimension is a lifeline for the island state.

**Importance of the Indian Ocean**

The importance of the Indian Ocean has been emphasized during this event. Why is it such an important and strategic entity? Let me just share some key data on the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean region consists of 28 states,\textsuperscript{xx} spans across three continents and covers 17.5 per cent of global land area.

In 2017, this region was home to 35 per cent of the world’s total population (2.6 billion people).

The Indian Ocean is home to major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas. These vital sea routes:

i. Facilitate maritime trade in the Indian Ocean region;

ii. Carry more than half of the world’s sea-borne oil; and

iii. Host 23 of the world’s top 100 container ports.

Container traffic through the region’s ports increased four-fold from 46 million TEUs in 2000 to 166 million TEUs in 2017.

Increased connectivity within the region has strengthened ties with external trading partners. China has emerged as the most important trading partner of the Indian Ocean region, accounting for 16.1 per cent of its total goods trade in 2017, up from 4.8 per cent in 2000.

Intra-regional trade is even stronger, accounting for 27.2 per cent of total trade in 2017. Here are just a few more figures to highlight the importance of the Indian Ocean:

i. It holds 16.8 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 27.9 per cent of proven natural gas reserves.

ii. Indian Ocean economies accounted for 35.5 per cent of global iron production and 17.8 per cent of world gold production in 2017.

\textsuperscript{xix} Maritime Port Authority of Singapore, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{xx} The 28 countries include 21 members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen), and Brunei, Cambodia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Timor-Leste and Vietnam.
iii. The region was also responsible for 28% of global fish capture in 2016. This has created a successful basis for export industries in several countries. For example, Indonesia and India accounted for four per cent of global frozen fish exports in 2017.

This abundance of natural resources, among other factors, has facilitated trade-led growth within this region.\textsuperscript{xiii}

**Singapore’s Key Principles and the Indian Ocean**

For Singapore, a founding member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), three key principles are crucial in relations to the Indian Ocean.

**Open Regional and International infrastructure**

At the Third Indian Ocean Conference last year, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Minister, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, stressed this point when he said, “The first thing which we in Singapore believe is that we need an open and inclusive regional architecture. The key words are ‘open’ and ‘inclusive’.”\textsuperscript{xiv}

Singapore’s policy imperative since independence has been to develop strong ties and enhance connectivity with its immediate neighbourhood and the wider world. ASEAN is a key regional bloc for Singapore. When communicating with the rest of the world, Singapore often prefers to articulate the larger ASEAN view. ASEAN is an association of 10 diverse countries with relatively short and, at times, turbulent histories. As such, for Singapore, interdependence is vital to securing peace and maintaining regional prosperity.

The emphasis on interdependence and interconnectedness are geared at ensuring the collective benefits for countries willing to come together economically and strategically. A small country like Singapore stands to lose much from zero-sum games and big power rivalries. As Dr Balakrishnan stated, “The aim is a win-win outcome. The opposite scenario of dividing into rival blocs, insisting in narrow independence, engaging in zero-sum competition, and becoming part of proxy wars is not Singapore’s way for peace and prosperity.”\textsuperscript{xv}

**Rules-based Order**

The second principle is the pursuit of a rules-based order.

Political scientists and economists have argued against the benefits of multilateralism – alliances have not always met the aspirations of the members. The question then is should multilateralism be abandoned? If not, how can we make it work?

Today, far more than ever before, there is a far need greater cohesion, greater cooperation and greater collaboration to deal with the diverse challenges we face. This mandates greater efforts on establishing alliances and partnerships of multiple countries to pursue common goals. Such alliances will ensure openness, predictability, stability and an acceptance of commonly agreed principles and rules. We must find ways to make multilateralism work. For Singapore, this is crucial.

At a recent presentation at the Committee of Supply Debate in Singapore, Dr Balakrishnan stated:

\textsuperscript{xiii} Lakshman Kadirkamar Institute, Sri Lanka, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{xv} Ibid.
“The global, multilateral rules-based trading system embodied by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is now under serious threat. The free, open, rules-based multilateral system actually has underpinned the success of Singapore and ASEAN, and has been the formula for peace and prosperity for many decades. Unfortunately, countries under domestic political pressure increasingly view multilateral agreements on issues such as trade, climate change, security, arms control and cyber security. They view multilateral agreements as shackles on sovereignty and a burden on economic growth. Therefore, leaders in these countries are resorting to unilateral actions and prefer bilateral deals instead of multilateral deals. They repudiate multilateral approaches and the multilateral institutions that have kept the peace and facilitated prosperity. So, over time, trade connectivity may shrink, tit-for-tat action on disputes will increase and our ability to respond to global challenges like radicalism, cyber security, and climate change will be impaired. Left unchecked, this will be a negative-sum game for everyone.”

Singapore has always supported and pushed for a rules-based global system. It is essential for all countries – big and small – to play by the same rules for a stable global world order. Otherwise, smaller countries are likely to bear the brunt of a brute-based global order. As Dr Balakrishnan stated, without the rule of international law, “the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must”. That is why Singapore has always been a staunch defender of international law and the multilateral system.

**Clear and Consistent Economic Strategy**

The last principle is a clear, complete and coherent economic strategy.

Since independence, the Singapore economy has experienced rapid economic development. The composition of Singapore’s exports has evolved over the years from labour-intensive to high value-added products, such as electronics, chemicals and biomedical. The importance of services to the Singapore economy also grew, as evidenced by the increasing share of the financial and business sectors of the economy. More recently, the focus has been on e-commerce, analytics and artificial intelligence, among others.

A key element of this clear and consistent economic strategy since 1965 is the continual and critical evaluation policies to adapt to changing regional and global priorities.

A speech by Singapore’s Minister for Trade and Industry, Mr Chan Chun Sing, at Singapore Economic Policy Forum last year is reflective of this constant recalibration of Singapore’s economic priorities. He highlighted several new regional and global trends and the need for Singapore to capitalise on the opportunities. These are:

First, we have a rapidly growing Asia. It is important for Singapore to remain relevant and seize the opportunities of a rapidly rising Asia. There is increasing urbanisation, and Asia, with China and India in the lead, is projected to represent 66 per cent of the global middle-class population. ASEAN’s combined GDP of US$2.6 trillion in 2016 made it the world’s sixth-largest economy. With an annual growth forecast of around five per cent, ASEAN is expected to become the fourth-largest economy by 2030. Singaporeans must understand the changing

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xxvii Ibid.

landscapes in these countries. Equally importantly, Singaporeans must find ways to make the best of opportunities offered by these changes.

Second, the rise of new technologies provides immense opportunities for Singapore. “These technologies will allow the country to transcend its age-old geographical constraints. If it seizes the opportunities well, the Singapore economy will no longer be constrained by size and will not need to compete on the basis of price alone. Instead, these new technologies allow Singapore to compete on the basis of connectivity, the quality of its ideas and the standard of trust that it can bring to the global markets.”

Finally, Singapore has a highly open and competitive economic environment. The island-state has one of the most open and business-friendly economies in the world. The World Bank has ranked Singapore highly in the ease of doing business. This is a strength that Singapore must continue to use to its advantage in an increasingly volatile world.

However, achieving a clear and consistent economic strategy is irrelevant, if the first two principles are not followed religiously by the regional and global communities. Ensuring an open and inclusive architecture and compliance with agreed rules by all states are not only essential for global stability, but it is also especially crucial to a small city-state like Singapore. The principle that agreements will be respected and will be implemented is fundamental for Singapore’s survival. It is in this belief that Singapore has consistently pursued bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements and other arrangements.

Conclusion

Moving forward, one can expect regional security and governance in the Indian Ocean to become more complex and complicated. Policy initiatives as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific, and the Quad, among others, are likely to further complicate the dynamics in the Indian Ocean.

It is, therefore, vital for small states like Singapore to push their agenda at every given opportunity and platform. Singapore must ensure that it is not treated as a player on the periphery or on the side-lines of Indian Ocean affairs. Singapore has done well thus far in this respect. One example mentioned earlier is Singapore being a founding member of IORA, which aims to promote regional economic cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Singapore has little choice but to continue to be part of the discussions on the Indian Ocean.

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xxix Ibid.
xxx Ibid.
8. A Sri Lankan Perspective of Indian Ocean Security and Governance
Admiral (Prof.) Jayantha Colombo
Director, Centre for Indo-Lanka Relations and Law of the Sea, Pathfinder Foundation

I am going to present you the Sri Lankan perspective of Maritime Security and Maritime governance in the Indian Ocean. Let me first explain how Sri Lanka views herself in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka is the southernmost land mass in Asia and of course in South Asia. It is closest to the busiest East-West Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) across the Indian Ocean through which 50% of world containers, 35% of bulk cargo and 75% of energy is transported from source country to destination country transit. In an average 250-300 merchant vessels pass the southern tip of Sri Lanka just 24 nautical miles away. About 60,000 ships p.a. traverse along this SLOC.

Sri Lanka and Ports

The Port of Colombo is the main, deep-water port in Sri Lanka, which is ranked as the 13th best connected port as twenty main-line operators are calling at this port. Furthermore, this is in the 22nd position in world best container ports and has recorded the fastest growth in 2018 with 7 million TEUs handled. Colombo is the only deep-water port in the region with the capacity to berth and handle mega container ships carrying 18,000 TEUs and above. There are two more deep water ports in Sri Lanka; Hambantota and Trincomalee. Trincomalee is the deepest, largest and the most sheltered natural harbour in the Indian Ocean. We have not yet fully exploited this port. Port of Hambantota is the closest port to the SLOC and is now given on a long-term lease of 99 years with 70% stake to China Merchant Port Holdings (CMPort), which is in fact the second largest port operator in the world. 32% of containers handled in port of Colombo are transhipment containers to and from India. Sri Lanka with its deep-water ports, aspires to be the maritime hub of the Indian Ocean. At this juncture, there is no major hub port in the Indian Ocean; there is one in Dubai in the Persian Gulf and the other is in Singapore, located in the Malacca Strait.

Sri Lanka located in a Geo-Strategically Important Location and Assisted by Other Navies and Coast Guards.

Due to its geographical location, Sri Lanka has been considered as strategically important by many major and minor players, who are present in the Indian Ocean. Many countries are helping Sri Lanka to develop its naval and Coast Guard capabilities. Australia donated two Bay class patrol boats in 2014 in appreciation of the contribution made towards countering irregular migration by sea. Japan has donated two 30-meter patrol boats and plans to donate one more, mainly for Coast Guard and prevention of pollution. Japan has also planned to build 02/03, 85-meter Offshore Patrol Vessels in Colombo. India being the closest neighbour has donated several OPVs to Sri Lanka and constructed two Advance Offshore Patrol Vessels to boost naval capabilities. The USA has donated one Coast Guard Cutter in 2002 and another one is currently being prepared for handing over in Hawaii. China is planning to donate a Frigate to Sri Lanka. In addition to naval and Coast Guard platforms, there are many joint training programmes and exercises that the Sri Lanka Navy is involved in. With India, Sri Lanka Navy undertake regular exercises such as Milan, and Sri Lanka -India Naval Exercises (SLINDEX). Sri Lanka also participated in Rim of Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise with the USA and Australia, off Hawaii in 2018 and PACIFIC Sea Lift and Pacific Airlift exercises, which are conducted in Sri Lanka. The United States Marine Corps is conducting regular joint training in jungle asymmetric warfare and fighting in urban terrain exercises in Trincomalee.

Sri Lanka’s Experience with Maritime Crime

Sri Lanka has battled with various types of maritime terrorism and crime as follows:
**Maritime Terrorism**

The top most of all was maritime terrorism. Sri Lanka had to fight with the ‘most ruthless terrorist organization in the world’, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE pioneered the suicide boat (Not Al Qaeda, which used the same tactic to attack USS Cole in Eden, Yemen in 2000 and MT Limburg off Yemen in 2002.) These suicide boats were compared to a sea-skimming anti-ship human guided missile. The LTTE used underwater craft and submersibles to attack naval and merchant vessels at sea and in harbours, mastered the swarming tactic to attack naval targets, and underwater saboteur attacks.

The LTTE also hijacked and pirated merchant vessels and laid sea mines. They were on the verge of operationalizing submarines and fortunately the war ended before they could complete the mission. The LTTE was the only terrorist organization to own and operate a fleet of ocean-going ships. They used these ships for various nefarious activities such as gun running, drug and human trafficking. The LTTE arms smuggling operations have been the largest so far by a terrorist group. They purchased, stockpiled and transported large quantities of artillery guns, mortars, ammunition for the same, tons of high explosives, swimmer delivery vehicles and other dual-use equipment, World War II torpedoes, dismantled light aircraft, large quantities of assault rifles, machine guns, and rocket propelled grenades etc., These items were not to fight a guerrilla war, but a near-conventional war.

The LTTE flouted international conventions, abused end user certificates and used port facilities catering for ships engaged in international voyages to berth and operate their fleet of ships. They flouted International Maritime Organization (IMO) laws and conventions governing flag of ships and IMO number. The Sri Lanka Navy for a long period was attempting to guard the coastal areas preventing these items from reaching the shores that were under LTTE domination, with limited success. Later, the Navy changed their tactics and ventured out to deep sea, far away from Sri Lanka to track down and destroy the LTTE warehouse ships. All operational LTTE merchant vessels were destroyed by 2007 by the Sri Lanka Navy, which was an attack on the centre of gravity of the LTTE; the international terrorist financing, money laundering and logistic transport LTTE network. These operations by the Sri Lanka Navy had a profound impact on the LTTE; removing their ability to fight with the ground forces in near-conventional battles, as they did not have sufficient quantities of military hardware.

**Human Trafficking or Irregular Migration by Sea**

Sri Lanka was considered a main source country for irregular migration by sea until about 2012. The LTTE was engaged in large-scale human trafficking, mainly to Europe, Canada and the USA and later trans-national crime syndicates engaged in trafficking humans to Australia. They used merchant vessels and multi-day fishing vessels, which lack basic safety and hygienic conditions. Many perished during the long and arduous journey. Joint efforts by Sri Lanka and Australia including conducting a Joint Working Group, intelligence sharing, technical assistance and addressing pull factors, helped to curb the menace. However, criminal groups are always trying different methodologies and destinations to carry on with their business. Right now, illegal immigrants are attempting to reach the French Reunion Island with the hope of reaching Europe.

**Countering Piracy**

In the case of Somali piracy, Sri Lanka was just outside the High-Risk Area (HRA) declared by the International Maritime Bureau functioning under the IMO. Sri Lanka became a hub for providing facilities for privately contracted security detachments on board merchant vessels, which are crossing the HRA. Sri Lanka has an abundance of highly trained and well experienced, battle hardened military personnel, who provided their service to protect the merchant shipping and large-fishing vessels. Incidence of piracy is near zero currently. However, it can surface again as the security situation in Somalia has not improved substantially and countries like Yemen have become ungovernable. Rampant piracy in the Horn of Africa compelled foreign navies to move in to the Indian Ocean to protect their shipping. Although piracy is almost negligible now, foreign navies are present in the Indian Ocean in large numbers. Presently there are about 100-120 warships operating in the Indian Ocean at any given time.
 Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs

Illegal narcotic trafficking has become a major threat to the Indian Ocean including Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka has become a major transshipment hub for heroin and Kerala Ganja (cannabis). In 2018 alone 2097 kilograms of Kerala Ganja was detected by the Sri Lanka Navy alone. In the same year, the Police seized 744 kg of heroin. The Australian Navy has seized and destroyed nearly a tonne of heroin in the Arabian Sea. The Indian Ocean has become a major transit for narcotic drugs produced in the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle. There are some successes in the fight against drug trafficking, but the thumb rule is that only 10% is seized and the remaining 90% ends up with drug barons.

 Threats posed by Natural Disasters, Impact of Global Warming

Sri Lanka ranks second in the Global Climate Risk Index 2019 and is likely to be affected by most extreme weather events (Puerto Rico ranks number one). There can be weather anomalies- extreme droughts and excessive rain and flooding - which will have serious implications on human security, livelihood security and environmental security. Currently ocean pollution is at an alarming level and we keep dumping plastics, industrial waste and untreated sewer to the rivers and oceans. There is a huge garbage patch in the southern Indian Ocean and a 60,000 Sq. k. m. dead zone in the Bay of Bengal, where there is very little oxygen left. Consequently, there is almost no life in this dead zone.

Rising global temperature and human and land induced pollution are impacting the health of the oceans around us. Scientists have discovered that ocean temperature has risen by 13% more than anticipated. The acidity in the oceans are also increasing. This will result in depletion of fisheries, coastal degradation, and severe impact on marine eco systems. Consequently, coastal communities’ food and livelihood security will be at great risk. We will need a regional approach to address the issue of marine pollution and sustainable exploitation of resources. Although we have artificial boundaries at sea, such as territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones, there are no physical boundaries at sea. What we have at sea are currents, tides, wind and waves, which move across the ocean. Individual countries cannot protect the oceans on their own. We need a regional approach to Maritime Environmental Protection (MEP). We also need to embark on joint research, joint surveys and collect ocean data and joint strategies to harness the full potential of ocean-based economy, whilst protecting health of the oceans. We also need preparations, planning and training for joint Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the IOR.

 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Maritime Safety and Security

Since the Jakarta Declaration, the IORA has been focusing on Maritime Security. As Sri Lanka has gained valuable experience in combatting maritime terrorism and maritime crime, IORA has tasked Sri Lanka to be the lead country in formulating policies for maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean. It is pertinent to mention that the Centre for Law of the Sea of Pathfinder Foundation launched a draft of a Code of Conduct (COC) to address maritime threats posed by non-state actors for the consideration by IORA. This could be considered as a base document when discussing maritime security threats.

 Sri Lanka and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)

Sri Lanka believes in overcoming the ‘Ocean-blindness’ by being able to monitor the ocean space to detect and deter maritime threats in the Indian Ocean. India, Maldives and Sri Lanka have signed a joint MDA concept to share information on white shipping. This MDA concept should be expanded to cover a wider area. Since the Western Indian Ocean is security wise volatile, it may not be possible to establish a wider MDA to cover that region. However, the Bay of Bengal is a possibility, as it will be in the best interest of all littorals and user countries of the Bay of Bengal. Pathfinder Foundation has proposed in ‘Trincomalee Consultations 2018: Secure and Safe Bay of Bengal
for Common Development and Prosperity” to establish a centre for MDA and Information fusion centre in Trincomalee, focusing on the Bay of Bengal.

Maritime Governance

Sri Lanka firmly believes in the need for maintaining a “Rules Based Maritime Order” in the Indian Ocean and it should be based on United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Sri Lanka also envisions freedom of navigation and overly, freedom of maritime commerce, transparency and good governance at sea. However, the USA is not a signatory to the UNCLOS although they abide by the principles of UNCLOS. Now that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ruled that Diego Garcia does not belong to the United Kingdom but to Mauritius; it would be interesting to monitor how things would work out for International law and the US military forces in Diego Garcia. The concept becomes problematic, when terms such as ‘liberal world Order’ and ‘like-minded democracies’ are used, as these would give rise to a suspicion of exclusivity and not inclusivity.

Maritime Strategies for Indian Ocean

We have quite a few strategies to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean and prevent a single hegemonic power from dominating the Indian Ocean. We have the USA led Indo Pacific Strategy (IPS). We hear about four pillar countries in IPS; Australia, India, Japan and USA. Then we have ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ of Japan. We also have Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), Neighbourhood First and Look East policies of India. How will these strategies work to improve the situation in the Indian Ocean? It will be interesting to see how these initiatives work in the future. Will they work in unison with a common objective or will they work in conflict based on individual interests is the question waiting for answers?

We also have many connectivity-oriented concepts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China, which is referred to as the biggest ever infrastructure related project in the world with one Trillion USD financial component and more than 70 countries participating. Then there are other initiatives such as Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) of India and Japan and Tri-lateral Partnership involving the USA, Japan and Australia for infrastructure related development in the Indo-Pacific. Are these initiatives merely to counter the BRI or alternative concepts, which will provide better choices for Indian Ocean Littorals?

Quad and Maritime Cold War?

Then we also hear about Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ‘Quad’ between USA, Japan, Australia and India. Also, we hear about ‘Quad Plus’, meaning possible inclusion of UK, France and Singapore. Will ‘Quad’ be a military alliance? Will not Quad lead to a ‘Maritime Cold War’ in the Indian Ocean? Will this lead to increased militarization of the Indian Ocean leading to an unnecessary arms race? These are the questions begging answers. The Indian Ocean is already heavily militarized. There are large number of warships, nuclear and conventional submarines in this ocean. Some of these may be carrying nuclear warheads and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Are we sitting on top of a volcano waiting to erupt? There are two nuclear rivals in the Indian Ocean; India and Pakistan and there is tension and conflict in the subcontinent for the last 71 years.

Warship Visits to Sri Lanka

When you analyse the number of warships that visited Sri Lankan ports from 2008 to February 2019, the number is 456. These warships belong to 28 different countries. India being the immediate neighbour leads with 93 ship visits, and Japan with 73 visits. Despite the common belief that China has a heavy presence in the country, the number of Chinese warships visited was 36. In 2008 the number had been only 15 visits and in 2017 it had risen to 66. These figures convey several situations. One is that Sri Lanka is a free country and navies around the world desired to visit Sri Lanka for operational reasons, training, good-will visits etc. Sri Lanka can benefit economically
from such visits and hence they are really welcome. These figures also indicate the extent of militarization of the Indian Ocean.

**China Factor, Debt Trap Accusation and Leasing of Strategic Assets**

Quite often Sri Lanka is cited as a country that has become strategic and military outpost for China. Fact of the matter is, Sri Lanka came out of a three-decade long violent armed conflict, which devastated the country, and retarded economic progress. There was not a single highway/expressway in the country until the conflict ended in May 2009. Once the conflict was over, the need for infrastructure was huge and China became the main development partner. India and Japan did their part, but the needed gap was massive and China swiftly filled that vacuum. This has raised strategic concerns among other stakeholders, who believe that Sri Lanka is in a dilemma.

One thing to remember is that Sri Lanka can never be a strategic threat to India. Sri Lanka is well within the Indian maritime and air security umbrellas. This is why the Chairman of the IAG in his memoirs referred to Sri Lanka as an aircraft career parked just 14 nautical miles away from India.

Sri Lanka should strictly adhere to the principle that its territory and territorial sea should not be allowed to be used by one country against another. Long term lease of national assets may not be the best option for Sri Lanka. Having committed a mistake, trying to provide strategic assets to other countries to compensate–for previous mistakes would worsen the situation leading to the weakening of the security of Sri Lanka. Against this backdrop, multiple investor involvements would be a better option for Sri Lanka. However, sovereignty and national security interests should be guarded, when dealing with any prospective investor. Sri Lanka has a unique advantage; the Sri Lanka Navy is the Designated Authority in Implementing International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and all the commercial ports should have an active duty senior naval officer as the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO). This arrangement should help convince other stakeholders regarding any Sri Lankan port being used by one country against another and to allay such fears and concerns.

**Way Forward**

Sri Lanka affirms that the Indian Ocean should have its own narrative and strategy to address issues concerning maritime safety, security, governance and marine environmental protection. SAGAR can be a common strategy for this region and there should be more discussion on this concept. We need to move from cooperation to collaboration. We need inclusive strategies and not exclusive ones. We need a rule based maritime order and hence we need to identify these rules should be. We need good governance at sea. We need respect for international laws, conventions and treaties. Should it be based on UNCLOS? We need to look at enhancing MDA to overcome ocean blindness. We should aim to cover the whole Indian Ocean. We can start with the Bay of Bengal as it is a relatively peaceful region and as such, agreement should be easy. Subsequently, we can think of the Indian Ocean as a whole. We need to focus on sharing resources, inter-operability, sharing intelligence to enhance regional maritime trade connectivity, and development of infrastructure. We need to discuss about a new regional maritime security and governance architecture. We could use the existing mechanism in the beginning such as BIMSTEC, IORA, IONS, WPNS. We need to be prepared for an Indian Ocean order, which we ourselves shape and not the other way around.

We need to understand and agree that unity within the region is the way to succeed. We need to move away from competition to cooperation and then to collaboration. Maritime security and governance are universal challenges. We need non-inclusive and non-confrontational strategies for the region. We need to agree that maritime governance is key to maintain the sanctity of the Indian Ocean, where freedom of maritime commerce can alleviate poverty. We need to discuss and agree on the way forward for common good and common prosperity of the littoral states in the Indian Ocean.
9. UK perspectives on ‘Indian Ocean Region: Maritime Security and Maritime Governance’

Viraj Solanki
Research Analyst for South Asia, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

My presentation will focus on the UK’s perspectives on maritime security and maritime governance in the Indian Ocean region.

In the next few minutes, I would like to do five things:

First, outline the importance of the Indian Ocean region to the UK.

Second, outline the UK’s perspective on the key security challenges in the Indian Ocean and how the UK is working to overcome these challenges, including through partnerships.

Third, outline the UK’s role in contributing to maritime governance in the region; as well as its work in enhancing regional connectivity.

Fourth, outline the UK’s concerns on non-traditional maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean region.

And finally, fifth, outline the UK’s approach to the Indian Ocean region post-Brexit.

Firstly, on the importance of the Indian Ocean region to the UK.

The importance of the oceans, including the Indian Ocean, to the UK, is primarily because the UK is a seafaring island nation, in which the freedom of sea lanes of communication and maritime routes are crucial to its prosperity and security. The UK has the 5th largest marine estate in the world, covering the UK and 14 overseas territories.

95% of the UK’s overall exports are transported by sea; and, 80% of the UK’s natural gas imports – a key component of its energy security – passes through the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is strategically significant for the UK, and provides the vital link between Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

The UK is committed to a secure, free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific, playing an active role in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region through military, multilateral and commercial engagement and capacity building.

The UK maintains a permanent physical presence in the Indian Ocean region through the British Indian Ocean Territory in the Chagos archipelago. The British Indian Ocean Territory provides the UK membership of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). The joint US/UK facility on Diego Garcia, supports regional operations, including through working to prevent human trafficking and countering narcotics and terrorism. However, in February 2019, the International Court of Justice provided a non-legally binding ruling that the UK should end its control of the Chagos islands ‘as rapidly as possible’. Although, the UK Foreign Office has stated that this ICJ ruling is an advisory opinion.

Within the Indian Ocean region, the UK’s primary focus is on the western Indian Ocean. The UK’s presence in the Indian Ocean region, in particular, in the Gulf has grown significantly in the past few years. Over 50 years after the UK’s withdrawal ‘east of Suez’, the Royal Navy now has its first permanent footprint in the region, after it opened a naval support facility in Bahrain in 2018, to build on its own strong bilateral trade, political and security links in the Gulf.
Secondly, on the UK’s perspective on the key security challenges in the Indian Ocean and how the UK is working to overcome these challenges, including through partnerships.

The UK’s 2014 National Security Maritime Strategy outlines its global approach to delivering maritime security. The UK’s main global maritime security objectives are fourfold:

- To promote and secure the International Maritime Domain and norms;
- To develop the capabilities of States of strategic maritime importance;
- To protect the UK and its Overseas Territories including from crime and illegal activity;
- And, to protect and secure maritime trade and energy routes.

The strategic approach of the UK towards maritime security is focused on UNDERSTANDING the maritime domain; having INFLUENCE through solving global issues and maintaining security with partners; ensuring PREVENT(ion) through sharing information and working in partnership with other States, as well as defending freedom of navigation and overflight; and finally, to PROTECT.

As part of the UK’s strategic approach to PROTECT the Indian Ocean – the UK’s primary security concern - particularly in the Western Indian Ocean - is working to counter terrorism and piracy, as well as preventing transnational crime, notably human and drug trafficking.

In December 2018, the UK highlighted its role as a ‘net security provider’ in the Indian Ocean region. This was the first time that the UK had publicly used this term to describe its security interests in the region, although it did not provide a definition of this specific role.

The UK’s naval support facility in Bahrain will increase the UK’s ability to supply naval assets into the Indian Ocean. This is in addition to the Royal Navy’s Maritime Component Command in Bahrain; as well as the UK’s Joint Logistics Support Base in Duqm in the Sultanate of Oman, which was also opened in 2018.

The UK’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region also includes through British Forces Brunei and the British Defence Singapore Support Unit.

Royal Navy officers have provided leadership to key maritime security initiatives in the region. Since its inception, the UK has provided the Operational Headquarters for the EU Naval Force’s Operation ATALANTA - which aims to counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia. However, at the end of this month, the operational headquarters of Operation ATALANTA will move from the UK to Spain, and the UK Operational Commander will be replaced by a Spanish Vice Admiral, due to the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. The EU Naval Force mission has been successful, with only two attempted attacks by pirates in 2018, which were both unsuccessful, compared to 174 attempted attacks, of which 47 were pirated in 2010. However, the risk of re-emergence remains.

The UK also actively contributes as a member of the US-led Combined Maritime Forces – based in Bahrain - consisting of 33 nations, for which the UK Royal Navy provides the permanent Deputy Commander.

Furthermore, the UK has provided Naval Liaison Officers in Seychelles, Kenya and Bahrain; and are also now seconding a Royal Navy officer to the Regional Coordination and Operations Centre in Seychelles – established in July 2017 - for the EU-funded MASE (European Maritime Security) programme in the western Indian Ocean. UK maritime domain awareness specialists provided support and guidance to the establishment of the centre.

On 12 March 2019, at the IISS, we, uniquely, hosted jointly the visiting Indian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba and the UK First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Philip Jones for a discussion session on maritime security. During this event, the UK First Sea Lord confirmed its support to India’s newly-established Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean region.
As part of its commitment to enhancing maritime domain awareness and ensuring the security of shipping transiting through the Indian Ocean region, in 2001, the UK established the Royal Navy’s Maritime Trade Operation, based at the UK embassy in Dubai. This information and advice service provide an operational interface between military and merchant shipping; as well as providing the primary point of contact for merchant vessels in the event of piracy. 80-85% of commercial ships in the region still voluntarily report in to UKMTO.

Additionally, the UK is working to overcome these challenges through an increase in its military presence in the region. The UK’s warships, aircraft and over 1000 deployed naval personnel operate from the Gulf into the Indian Ocean. Moreover, in February 2019, the UK’s Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson, announced that HMS Queen Elizabeth the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carrier’s first operational mission in 2021 will travel through the Straits of Malacca. One of two new Littoral Strike Groups will also be based in the Indo-Pacific.

In 2018, the Royal Navy deployed three ships to the Indo-Pacific – the Type-23 frigates HMS Sutherland and Argyll, and the assault ship HMS Albion. The Type-45 destroyer HMS Dragon also carried out the bilateral naval exercise Konkan with the Indian navy off the coast of Goa in late 2018. While the Type-23 frigate HMS Montrose has been deployed in the South China Sea in early 2019, and will imminently be stationed at the UK Naval Support Facility in Bahrain for up to three years.

Furthermore, The UK’s Joint Force 2025 – announced during the UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review – will have a focus on ensuring a UK presence in the Indian Ocean region. This will include two Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and submarines.

**Partnerships**

In addition, the UK is working to make the Indian Ocean ‘more secure’ by working with its partners in the region. The UK has a White Shipping Agreement with India where the two countries share information on the region. Alongside carrying out bilateral naval exercises with the India, the Royal Navy also actively engages with Japan, Australia and the US in the region.

In December 2018, the UK and Japan underlined their commitment to strengthen their bilateral cooperation on maritime security capacity building in the Indo-Pacific, including in Sri Lanka. The UK has also recently stated its aim to improve maritime co-operation between India, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar and Sri Lanka focused on upgrading ports and development of infrastructure.

Third, the UK’s role in contributing to maritime governance in the region; as well as its work in enhancing regional connectivity.

The UK has contributed an active role in maritime governance in the region, through its membership in two of the key regional security architectures. The UK is a member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) through the British Indian Ocean Territory. While, the UK is also a dialogue partner in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Additionally, the UK is also a strong supporter of the Djibouti Code of Conduct on the repression of piracy in the western Indian Ocean.

During the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018, a senior UK diplomat, outlined that to increase regional connectivity, there was a ‘very significant need for increased investment in particular in transport infrastructure, which limits economic growth in the region.’

The UK government’s Department for International Development (DFID) has recently made a commitment to continue engaging in regional connectivity projects in the Indian Ocean for the next four years. Working alongside
partners, the UK has leveraged USD3 billion of financing for regional infrastructure; and created an additional 1935MW of cross border transmission capacity in the region.

Fourth, on the UK’s concerns on non-traditional maritime security threats.

Another major challenge that the UK is working to overcome, is non-traditional maritime security threats and the environment, including the impact of climate change on sea levels and on temperatures of the sea.

In June 2018, the UK announced its International Ocean Strategy, to ensure its strategic commitment to the sustainability of the oceans. The UK’s objective is that by 2030 the ocean will be effectively governed, clean, and biologically diverse. The focus areas of this UK strategy include climate change and pollution.

Additionally, the UK had made the British Indian Ocean Territory the world’s largest no-take marine protected area, ensuring an obligation to minimise human disturbance.

Fifth, and finally, the UK’s approach to the Indian Ocean region post-Brexit.

As the UK’s withdrawal from the EU potentially draws closer, there is an acute consciousness to maintain global linkages and presence including in the Indian Ocean. Post-Brexit, the UK is aiming to increase its engagement in the Indian Ocean region.

The UK has emphasised ASEAN centrality as part of its engagement in the region, and has over 50 diplomatic missions across the region, including missions in all 10 ASEAN member states. The UK foreign secretary has also recently announced the opening of three new diplomatic posts in the Indo-Pacific, including in the Maldives and Djibouti. This will mean that the UK will have diplomatic representation in all Indian Ocean littoral states except Comoros.

In December 2018, I argued in an article for the IISS that the opening of the UK’s first embassy in the Maldives presents a unique opportunity for the two nations to increase cooperation on Indian Ocean and security issues. As the only diplomatic outpost of any Western country in the Maldives, the embassy will provide a platform for the two countries to address shared interests and concerns on maritime security.

The UK has stated that its new embassy will reflect its role as a ‘net security provider’ in the Indian Ocean region. The UK could work with the Maldives and India, which also seeks a role as a ‘net security provider’ in the region, on the joint delivery of public security goods, including maritime domain awareness. There is also scope for cooperation with other extra-regional Indian Ocean powers, including the US and France, to ensure a more secure region.

In conclusion, the UK is operating and engaging widely in the Indian Ocean, and has an intent to enhance its future role in the Indian Ocean region and the wider Indo-Pacific. However, an increase in the necessary political will and military capacity is needed for a notable expansion of the UK’s role in the Indian Ocean region.

Thank you.
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Subsequent to the presentations made on country perspectives by IAG members, discussions were held on important aspects relating to Indian Ocean maritime security and governance issues, during which discourse following points were highlighted with a view to feeding into PF-IOSC (Pathfinder Foundation's Indian Ocean Conference);

1. **Visions for the Indian Ocean Region**

   The importance of projecting a vision for the Indian Ocean region was highlighted. There are a few strategies focusing on the Indian Ocean together with the Pacific Ocean, such as Japan's 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP)', USA's 'Indo Pacific Strategy', China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India's SAGAR, Neighborhood First and Act East strategies. There needs to be synergy between these strategies or visions to develop the region in a cooperative and sustainable way. Sri Lanka being one of the most important strategic locations in the Indian Ocean, could be the catalyst for synergizing the development strategy for the Indian Ocean.

2. **Infrastructure Development**

   With regard to infrastructure development in the region and World Bank group’s estimate of 50% of world’s infrastructure requirements being in Asia, it was observed that SAARC is the least integrated region that has experienced a lack of infrastructure development, especially in maritime infrastructure. It was observed that there are several maritime infrastructure development projects such as FOIP, BRI, Sagarmala & SAGAR of India etc. which are designed to address this shortcoming. In this context, it was noted that lack of focus on economic development in the IOR (Indian Ocean Region) was an issue of concern, as the focus is mostly related to international relations and strategic issues.

3. **UNCLOS**

   The status of the UNCLOS was discussed, focusing primarily on the situation under which it was negotiated and agreed upon and the fact that the situation was much different then and now. One of the most sensitive areas under the Convention is the “Right of Innocent Passage” and how to interpret it. The meeting highlighted the need to interpret application of UNCLOS in today’s context, although it has stood the test of time and contributed to resolving many issues in the past.

4. **QUAD**

   Australia’s perspective of the Quad, was discussed. Clarification provided referred to several discourses on the Quad. It was observed that circumstances have changed in the region in the past decade. The logic of Quad is now more compelling, but should not be viewed through the narrow lens of military cooperation, but as an opportunity for the four states, which share similar values and overlapping interests to engage in dialogue.
5. **Code of Conduct**

The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) was referred to in regard to the fact that it was later amended thereby expanding its applicability. There was a discussion whether DCoC should be made applicable to the whole of the Indian Ocean. In that regard, attention was drawn to the apparent resistance to the Pathfinder Foundation’s draft Code of Conduct for the Indian Ocean targeting non-state actors. It was opined that what is important now is to expand the scope of the COC to facilitate governments to adhere to a set of rules governing the Indian Ocean.

6. **Confidence Building**

Transparency was highlighted as a contributory factor towards Confidence Building Measures that would be helpful in maintaining maritime security. Examples for lack of CBMs and transparency were cited in relation to the Chinese submarine visit to Colombo in 2014, and the meeting was urged to add this theme as topic to be addressed at the PF-IOSC.

7. **Technology (AI)**

The effects of Artificial Intelligence and its impact on industrial revolution 4.0 that is currently taking place was highlighted. Impact of technology in relation to the IOR was highlighted. Further, the need to focus how AI would impact on the Indian Ocean was discussed.

8. **PF-IOSC**

In terms of participation at the PF-IOSC, being a track 1.5 exercise, officials could participate as representatives of governments concerned. Such participation of officials would ensure the outcomes and outputs of the conference are fed back to the governments concerned. Subject matter experts could also be invited. PF-IOSC could share the output of its deliberations with organizations such as IORA, IONS and IOC.

A query was raised as to how the proposed conference could fit into the track I Indian Ocean Conference organized by the Government of Sri Lanka. It was confirmed that Pathfinder Foundation would share the report of the conference including the recommendations with the Government and other interested parties and the PF-IOSC would complement the track I initiative of the Government. PF-IOSC would endeavour to focus on selected specific areas without duplicating efforts of other track I or II initiatives in the region.

It is essential to examine where the final PF- IOSC would take us and what would be the main advantages of Sri Lanka playing a role in terms of the Indian Ocean and how to lever those advantages for a meaningful outcome, which would contribute positively to maintain a free and open and International rule based maritime order. The proposed conference should address issues of excessive debts associated with mega-projects some of which may be unsustainable, sovereignty issues resulting from losing control of strategic assets, freedom of maritime trade and how to ensure an international rule based maritime governance in the Indian Ocean.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP (IAG) ON INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE 2020

18 March 2019, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Following recommendations were made by the IAG during its meeting held on 18th March 2019 with a view to preparing for the Pathfinder Foundation’s Indian Ocean Security Conference 2020 (PF-IOSC 2020):

1. The PF-IOSC 2020 Conference should be a track 1.5 initiative involving governments and non-government participants. The proposed conference could complement similar track I initiatives on the Indian Ocean. To facilitate such complementarity, Pathfinder Foundation would share the report of the conference, including the recommendations, with participating governments and other interested parties.

   Participation: The following should be invited to attend the conference

   i. All member countries of the IAG.

   ii. Indian Ocean rim countries consisting of:


   iii. The European Union and ASEAN.

   iv. Consider inviting hinterland countries of the Indian Ocean (Note: cost will be high and logistics will be difficult).

2. Consider gender balance and representatives of affected communities, such as Fishers. (The need for gender balancing could be pursued with those responsible for nominating participants. However, ensuring participation of affected communities will be a difficult task).

3. Main Areas of Focus

   i. Traditional Security Threats

   • Reliance on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to jointly address the common threats in the IOR.

   • Explain objectives of various strategies for maritime security and governance to ensure transparency and inclusiveness; Identify geographical boundaries of various strategies.

   • Synergize various strategies, so that they will act in unison rather than in conflict.

   • Crystalize a vision for the region to develop in a cooperative and sustainable manner and individual countries to identify what they need.
• Work to achieve cooperative and sustainable mechanisms for maintaining maritime security and governance.

• Need for non-containment and adoption of inclusive policies.

\textit{ii Non-traditional security threats:}

• Maritime terrorism and impact of radicalization.
• Maritime crime, piracy, smuggling of narcotic drugs and weapons, irregular migration by sea.
• IUU fishing.
• Marine pollution and Marine Protection Areas.
• Impact of global warming, sea level rising and weather anomalies and environmental security.
• Bottoms up issues-based approach.
• Multilateral/ regional approach for problem solving.
• Regional approach for blue economy.
• Involvement of the civil society.
• Cyber security

\textit{iii Maritime Infrastructure Development:}

• Involvement of multiple investors.
• Transparency and openness.
• Concern for sovereignty and national security.
• Synergy between Infrastructure initiatives.
• Synergy between the two continents: Asia and Africa.
• How to separate military and economic activities?

\textit{iv. Maritime Governance Issues:}

• Free and Open Indian Ocean, Retaining Indian Ocean identity.
• Connectivity between the Bay of Bengal countries and East Asia.
• Maintain stability currently prevailing in the Indian Ocean.
• Confluence of Indian and Pacific Oceans.
• Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and its implications on Indian Ocean maritime security.
• Respect for interests of major and middle naval powers.
• International rules based maritime order (Consensus based/ binding), UNCLOS, system of rules applicable for all states.
• Security approach beyond traditional military.
• Maritime Domain Awareness and information sharing.
• Use of technology to avoid geographical constraints.
• Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.

\textit{v. Role of Sri Lanka:}

• Use the strategic location advantage.
• Use non-aligned foreign policy advantage.
• Capitalize on free access of Sri Lanka to all states within and outside the IOR.
• Use Sri Lanka's credibility advantage to play a key role in the Indian Ocean related matters.

4 The main themes suggested for the PF-IOSC to be held in the first quarter of 2020 are as follows;
   a. Maritime Security
   b. Freedom of Navigation and Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC)
   c. Enhancing Connectivity
   d. Confidence Building Measures in the Indian Ocean Region
   e. The role of regional organizations and recommendations for these to be focused.
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